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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Boundaries-Parol Boundary Settlements--Statute of Frauds
A and B, owners of coterminous tracts of land, are uncertain
as to the correct physical location of the boundary line between them.
Their uncertainty arises honestly, though it might be resolved by
accurate survey related to a demonstrably better record title or by
resort to title by adverse possession in either party.1 Anxious to
resolve their honest dispute, the parties orally agree' upon the location of a boundary line. This boundary is acquiesced in by both
parties and recognized in subsequent use. Thereafter one of the
parties or his assign' reneges and claims more than the land lying
on his side of the orally agreed boundary line. In resulting litigation, will the boundary line orally agreed upon be upheld against the
reneging party or his assignee?
A majority of jurisdictions uphold such agreements,4 even though
it is now possible to prove that the reneging party's claim is based
on what is demonstrably the true line.' In a recent case," the North
' This fact situation serves to define the scope of the problem to be dealt
with by this note. The treatment of this note, however, does not deal with
the established North Carolina law that contemporaneously erected monuments control over actual calls in the deed. E.g., Dudley v. Jeffress, 178
N.C. 111, 100 S.E. 253 (1919); Millikin v. Sessoms, 173 N.C. 723, 92 S.E.
359 (1917).
'These parol agreements, like a written agreement to the same effect,
must be supported by sufficient consideration. E.g., McGinty v. Interstate
Land & Improvement Co., 92 Ga. App. 770, 90 S.E.2d 42 (1955). However, the definite settlement of a previously undefined or doubtful boundary
is sufficient consideration to uphold the agreement. E.g., Hotze v. Ring,
273 Ky. 48, 115 S.W.2d 311 (1938).
In the majority of jurisdictions, these parol settlements are binding upon
the parties and their successors in title. E.g., Huff v. Holley, 101 Ga. App.
292, 113 S.E.2d 493 (1960); Huffman v. Mills, 131 W. Va. 218, 46 S.E.2d
787 (1948).
'E.g., Clements v. Cox, 230 Ark. 818, 327 S.W.2d 83 (1959); Ernie v.
Trinity Lutheran Church, 51 Cal. 2d 702, 336 P.2d 525 (1959); Callaway
v. Armour, 207 Ga. 229, 60 S.E.2d 367 (1950) ; Turner v. Bowens, 180 Ky.
755, 203 S.W. 749 (1918); Schroeder v. Engroff, 52 N.J. Super. 88, 144
A.2d 808 (Super. Ct. 1958); Lynch v. Lynch, 236 S.C. 612, 115 S.E.2d
301 (1960); Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274 (1958).
See generally 2 TiTANY, REAL PROPERTY § 653 (3rd ed. 1939) ; Annot., 69
A.L.R. 1430, 1433 (1930).
'E.g., Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra note 4; Aldrich v.
Brownell, 45 R.I. 142, 120 Atl. 582 (1923); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 137 Tex. 59, 152 S.W.2d 711 (1941). But the agreement will be upheld
only in the absence of fraud or concealment by either party.
' Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
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Carolina Supreme Court reserved decision on the point, raising a
query whether statements in prior decisions would preclude adopting
the majority rule.1
Despite the widespread acceptance of the majority rule as above
stated in general form, the decisions8 and the authorities9 interpreting them are confusing in their analysis of the problem itself
and the rationale of decision. The theories upon which such agreements are sustained are variously stated as being estoppel,'" practical
location," or simply contract by parol agreement. 2 The only real
difficulty in sustaining them is of course that provided by the Statute
of Frauds. 3 Courts sustaining them surmount this difficulty either
head on by saying that there is no conveyance involved, 4 or in side' In this case the evidence showed that the true boundary line was ascertainable as a matter of law and its location was thus possible by an accurate
survey. The court, in reserving decision on the question whether under
.any circumstances a subsequent parol agreement could fix a boundary line,
expressly stated that it can not be utilized where as here, the true boundary
line is "certain." Thus, the court has left the question open only with respect
to situations where the true boundary is "uncertain" in the objective sensethat is its identity can not be established as a matter of law by reference to
paramount title muniments. This puts a more restricted meaning on "uncertain" than do some courts which would find the requisite "uncertainty"
possible even in this factual context. E.g., Schneider v. Pascoe, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 709, 118 P.2d 860 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941), holding that the requisite
"uncertainty" refers simply to the subjective state of mind and that "uncertainty" may exist even though an accurate survey could be made from
the calls in the deed.
' See, e.g., Callaway v. Armour, 207 Ga. 229, 60 S.E.2d 367 (1950);
Fuelling v. Fuesse, 43 Ind. App. 441, 87 N.E. 700 (1909); Winborn v.
Alexander, 39 Tenn. App. 1, 279 S.W.2d 718 (1954).
' See, e.g., Bua3y, REAL PROPERTY § 250 (2d ed. 1954) ; 6 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY § 3299 (perm. ed. 1940) ; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4,

at § 653.
"E.g, Dunn v. Fletcher, 266 Ala. 273, 96 So. 2d 257 (1957) ; Johnson
v. Smith, 215 Ark. 247, 219 S.W.2d 926 (1949); Thomas v. Harlan, 27
Wash.
2d 512, 178 P.2d 965 (1947).
"1 E.g., Guy v. Lancaster, 250 Ala. 287, 34 So. 2d 499 (1948); Lake v.
Crosser,
202 Okla. 582, 216 P.2d 583 (1950).
2
E.g., Wright v. Anthony, 205 Ga. 47, 52 S.E.2d 316 (1949); Howard
v. Howard, 271 Ky. 773, 113 S.W.2d 434 (1938); Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn.
App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274 (1958); Huffman v. Mills, 131 W. Va. 218, 46
S.E.2d 787 (1948).
"3The other possible reason for not sustaining these agreements is that
it would violate the parol evidence rule. This argument was rejected in
Diggs v. Kurtz, 132 Mo. 250, 33 S.W. 815 (1896), and Fehrman v. Bissell
Lumber Co., 188 Wis. 82, 205 N.W. 905 (1925), appeal dismissed, 274 U.S.
720 (1927). And certainly the parol evidence rule should not operate to
destroy the validity of such agreements which change or modify the original
instrument. Whitehurst v. FCX Fruit & Vegetable Serv., Inc., 224 N.C.
628," 32
S.E.2d
34 (1944).
E.g.,
Downing
v. Boehringer, 82 Idaho 52, 349 P.2d 306 (1960);
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stepping fashion, by reliance upon possession and acquiescence. 15
Actually, depending upon the factual context giving rise to the dispute and the resulting agreement, there may well be a conveyance
involved, so that the first ground for surmounting the Statute of
Frauds in those contexts is certainly questionable. Analysis of these
various factual contexts may therefore be helpful in anticipating what
course our court will follow when confronted with a proper case.
The dispute uniformly required'0 could and does arise for any
one of several reasons: (a) the true boundary line is described by
reference to variable geographical feature ;17 (b) the true boundary
line is described by a call which is intrinsically ambiguous so that
location by accurate survey is impossible;"s (c) the true boundary
line is described solely by reference to monuments which are not now
in existence, so that location by accurate survey is impossible;"O (d)
the parties are honestly in dispute by reason of an inartful description of monuments of lost but not indispensable monuments, neither
Jones v. Scott, 314 Ill. 118, 145 N.E. 378 (1924); Turner v. Bowens, 180
Ky. 755, 203 S.W. 749 (1918).
1In order for the parol agreement to be valid, many jurisdictions require
that the parties assert possession up to the agreed line. E.g., Downing v.
Boehringer, supra note 14; Lynch v. Lynch, 236 S.C. 612, 115 S.E.2d 301
(1960); Van Deven v. Harvey, 9 Wis. 2d 124, 100 N.W.2d 587 (1960).
Why the possession is necessary does not appear from the decisions but
in 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 653, it is suggested that the taking of
possession constitutes part performance and removes the case from the Statute
of Frauds. Note, however, that North Carolina has not recognized the
doctrine of part performance in other contexts. E.g., Ballard v. Boyette,
171 N.C. 24, 86 S.E. 175 (1915). See generally Notes, 39 N.C.L. Rv.
96 (1960); 15 N.C.L. Rlv. 203 (1937). But cf. Herring v. Volume Merchandise, Inc., 249 N.C. 221, 106 S.E.2d 197 (1958), holding that while an
oral executory surrender of a lease having more than three years to run
must be in writing an actual surrender of such a lease need not be in writing
to be enforceable since the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory, as
distingiushed from executed, contracts. See also Herring v. Volume Merchandise, 252 N.C. 450, 113 S.E.2d 814 (1960) (same case on later appeal).
See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961). It would seem that this
same rule would apply to a parol settlement of a boundary dispute where
the parties have acquiesced in the settlement and recognized it in subsequent
use of the land.
1 In the absence of even subjective uncertainty or vagueness as to the
location of the boundary line, no parol agreement is admissible to alter the
true dividing line as this obviously would conflict with the Statute of Frauds.
E.g., Gee v. McDowell, 209 Ga. 265, 71 S.E.2d 532 (1952); Carver v.
Turner, 310 Ky. 99, 219 S.W.2d 409 (1949); May v. Abernathy, 23 Tenn.
App. 236, 130 S.W.2d 135 (1939).
"' Muchenberger v. City of Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 635, 275 Pac. 803
(1929).
" Callaway v. Armour, 207 Ga. 229, 60 S.E.2d 367 (1950).
19 Engle v. Beatty, 41 Ohio App. 477, 180 N.E. 269 (1931).
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of which make location by accurate survey impossible;2 (e) the
parties are honestly in dispute because of conflicting calls in their
respective muniments of title, although the true boundary could be
established by survey based upon the demonstrably better record
title. 2
Courts sustaining the agreements have not generally discriminated between these contexts. But it seems clear that (a), (b) and
(c), where the very identification of the true line as opposed to its
location is impossible, present clearer cases for holding no conveyance and hence no violation of the Statute of Frauds, than do (d)
and (e). Some courts have tacitly recognized this important line of
distinction by saying that (d) and (e) do not involve bona fide
disputes,22 others by pointing out more clearly that in these cases
where the true boundary is really ascertainable, i.e., is legally
identifiable, parol agreements purporting to vary it violate the
Statute of Frauds.23 The latter reasoning is certainly preferable,
since this goes to the heart of the matter, and since even in these
cases there may well be a subjectively "honest" or "bona fide" dispute and uncertainty between the parties.
It is believed that in a proper case, one involving an objective uncertainty of the (a), (b), or (c) type situations, nothing in previous
North Carolina cases would preclude the court from enforcing a subsequent parol agreement fixing a disputed boundary line. Indeed, it
is in these very contexts that the court apparently reserved decision
in the Andrews 4 case.
The cases cited by the court as containing language which might
possibly preclude enforcement of such agreements appear to be those
involving no objective uncertainty.23 In each of the cases the line
0
" Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
2This type of situation gives rise to a "lappage." Webb v. Harris, 44
Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274 (1958).
22
See, e.g., Brock v. Muse, 232 Ky. 293, 22 S.W.2d 1034 (1930).
:'E.g., Lacy v. Bartlett, 78 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
'Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
" In Woodard v. Harrell, 191 N.C. 194, 132 S.E. 12 (1926), the court
found as a matter of law no ambiguity in the calls of the deeds introduced by the plaintiff. Thus while there was subjective uncertainty, objective uncertainty was missing and the subsequent parol agreement was
not allowed. In Wiggins v. Rogers, 175 N.C. 67, 94 S.E. 685 (1917),
the court held that the subsequent parol agreement was incompetent to
show a line different from the true line. The facts given in the report
do not reveal whether the uncertainty was objective in nature, but it
probably was not since the established line could not be said to be at variance
with the true line unless the latter could be accurately established. Daniel v.
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was legally "certain," i.e., it could be made certain by accurate survey based upon the muniments of title. Hence, when the appropriate
case of true objective uncertainty does arise,2" North Carolina counsel would seem to have had the door opened wide enough by the
Andrews2 7 dictum to argue persuasively for outright adoption of the
majority rule allowing enforcement of parol agreements in such
cases."
Such a result would accord with generally accepted public
policy considerations. 9
J. DONNELL LASSITER
Charitable Trusts-Application of Cy Pres to a Discriminatory Trust
In a recent New Jersey decision 1 the cy pres doctrine2 was
Tallassee Power Co., 204 N.C. 274, 168 S.E. 217 (1933), lacked the requisite
objective uncertainty as the court found the deeds were not ambiguous and
the boundary line could be made certain. Whether the uncertainty present
in Kirkpatrick v. McCracken, 161 N.C. 198, 76 S.E. 821 (1912), was objective in nature is inconclusive on the facts and opinion. In any event,
evidence of the subsequent parol agreement was admitted, although the
court said it felt the trial court had confined the evidence to the restricted
purpose of establishing damages.
"' And when counsel on trial is astute to make the record show that there
is objective uncertainty involved. It seems at least possible from reading
our cases that the absence up to now of clear analysis along the lines suggested may be the result of failure by counsel clearly to develop this critical
point for the appellate records.
2
'Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
" It is unlikely that any of the parol agreements litigated in the past were
the result of specific counsel by lawyers. Of course, in the rare instance
where the lawyer's advice is sought ahead of time, the correct counsel is to
enter into a written and recorded boundary line agreement, whether the
dispute arises out of objective or merely subjective uncertainty.
' "These settlements of disputed, conflicting, or doubtful boundaries
should be encouraged by the courts as a means of suppressing spiteful and
vexatious litigation, and thus banishing from peaceful communities a fruitful
source of discord. 'Convenience, policy, necessity, justice-all unite in sustaining such an amicable agreement.'" McArthur v. Henry, 35 Tex. 801,
816 (1869). Quoted with approval in Sobol v. Gulinson, 94 Colo. 92, 95, 28
P.2d 810, 811 (1933).
1 Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961).
2 The cy pres doctrine is an equitable doctrine applied to prevent the
failure of a charitable trust when the settlor's scheme is, or has become, impractical, impossible, or illegal to carry out. It is based on the presumption
that his wishes will more nearly be fulfilled by alteration of the trust and
its application to a purpose "as near as possible" to his original intent,
rather than declaring a partial intestacy. See, e.g., Petition of Pierce, 153
Me. 180, 188, 136 A.2d 510, 515 (1957). See generally 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES §§ 431-41 (1953); FiscH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 399 (1959); 4
SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 399-.5 (2d ed. 1956); SHERIDAN & DELANY, THE CYPRES DOCTRINE (1959).
The doctrine has gained wide acceptance in the
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applied to strike the words "Protestant" and "Gentile" from a.
testamentary charitable trust. The trust was to provide scholarship
loan funds for "deserving American born, Protestant, Gentile boys of
good moral repute not given to gambling, smoking, drinking or
similar acts" at Amherst College. The college was to act as trustee.
Since its charter expressly forbids discrimination among its students
or faculty on religious grounds,' the trustees of the college refused
to serve as trustees or to co-operate with any substituted trustee.
The court found the designated purposes to be sufficiently
broad to create a charitable trust,4 the primary object of the testator's

bounty to be Amherst College rather than students of a particular
religious persuasion,' and held that under the circumstances administration of the trust by a substituted trustee would be impracticable.'
Prior to the principal case, there have been at least three instances in which a court of equity has been requested to apply thecy pres doctrine to delete discriminatory provisions from charitable
United States, but has been rejected in North Carolina. Board of Educ. v.
Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 1 S.E.2d 544 (1939).

Wagner, 219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
§ 3.02; Note, 27 N.C.L. Rxv. 591 (1949).

But see Johnson v.

See also FIscH, supra at

'MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 84, § 6 (1824).
'The court took the position that the" 'general charitable intent' ordinarilyused by the courts articulating the doctrine does not require an intention to
benefit charity generally. It requires only a charitable purpose which is
broader than the particular purpose the effectuation of which is impossible,
impractical or illegal." Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 501, 170,
A.2d 39, 43 (1961). In support of the foregoing statement the court cited
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399, comment c (1935), which does not support
it. Bogert argues that the whole concept of general charitable intent is really
a fiction used to rationalize a desired result. 2A BOGERT, op. cit. supranote 2, at § 436. That seems to be the case here. See note 21 infra.
'The court considered the testator's life-long interest in Amherst, his.
contributions to alumni fund drives, attendance at class reunions, etc. The
court thus removed from consideration the possibility of settling the trust on
another institution willing to observe its restrictions. Con pare this with
Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d 581 (App. D.C. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 773'
(1944) (the Ackland Museum case), where evidence of the same nature was.
excluded. See also Note, 27 N.C.L. REv. 591 (1949).
'But cf. Barclay Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 489 (Orphans' Ct. 1959),
where the testatrix' intent was to assist German university students from
a particular area of Germany. Under German law a university was not
capable of accepting or administering a trust limited to a specially designatect.
class of beneficiaries. The trust did not fail but the court devised a scheme
for appointment of private trustees to administer the fund in accord with
the testatrix' wishes. The dissenter in the principal case thought the diffi-

culties of administration by a substituted trustee were not insurmountable.
Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 511, 170 A.2d 48 (1961).
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trusts,' but only in In re Dominion Students' Hall Trust,' an English case, has the attempt succeeded. This case involved a trust
devoted to the maintenance of a hostel for the benefit of male students of "European origin" from overseas dominions of the British
Empire. The cy pres doctrine was applied to delete the discriminatory restriction, for it was felt that it tended to defeat the primary
object of the trust by antagonizing the very students whom the
charity sought to benefit."
The leading American case in which this issue was raised is
Girard Will Case.x° Girard's will limited the beneficiaries of his
bounty to "poor, white male orphans," and named the City of Philadelphia as trustee. In 1954 two Negro boys were denied admission
to Girard College solely on the ground that they were not white.
Suit was brought against the Board of Directors of City Trusts.
The Mayor of Philadelphia and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania intervened as co-plaintiffs. One of the arguments before the
Orphans' Court" was that the "white" restriction was against the
public policy of Pennsylvania and the United States, and that the
' The question of what to do about religious restrictions in a trust usually
arises where the fund has become inadequate to carry out the testator's purpose, or where the designated trustee has ceased to exist. See, e.g., Matter
of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 177 (1916) (insufficient funds);
People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N.E. 944 (1913) (trustee
no longer in existence). See generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 78 (1949).
Religious restrictions were completely ignored in First Trust Co. v. Thompson, 147 Neb. 366, 23 N.W.2d 339 (1946); cf. Application of Italian Benevolent Inst., 157 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1956). But see In re Rupprecht's
Will, 271 App. Div. 376, 65 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1946), aff'd without opinion, 297
N.Y. 462, 74 N.E.2d 175 (1957); Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H.
207, 49 A.2d 922 (1946).
8 [1947] Ch. 183 (1946). See Note, 14 SOL. 140 (1947). See also In re
Queen's School, [1910] 1 Ch. 796. The school's endowment trust required
the head mistress to be a communicant of the Church of England. In order
to obtain government aid the trustees requested the court to delete this
provision. The suit was successful, but through alteration of a previous cy
pres scheme drawn by the Charity Commissioners in 1900.
9 [1947] Ch. at 186. It is submitted that this decision was not cited in
the principal case because Dominion Students did not involve a testamentary
trust but one created by private subscription, and it appeared that at least
seventy-five per cent of the subscribers favored deletion of the "European"
restriction. There was, therefore, no substantial question of what the settlor
of the trust would have preferred had he foreseen a failure of the purpose of
his trust. The court's path in Dominion Students was also smoothed by the
fact that it was not actually an adversary proceeding. Although the Attorney General was the nominal defendant, he argued in support of the plaintiff's petition. Id. at 185-86.
1

386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).

" Girard Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671 (Orphans' Ct. 1956).
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court should exercise the cy pres power to strike the racial restriction. 2 The court held that the city in administering the trust
was not performing a governmental function; that there was therefore no illegality of purpose; and that there had been no failure of
purpose since there was no shortage of white applicants. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 3 The United States Supreme Court in a per curiam decision reversed and remanded,' 4
holding that the city could not administer a racially discriminatory
trust on the authority of Brown v. Board of Educ.'5 The orphans'
court seized on the loophole and merely replaced the Board of City
Trusts with thirteen private trustees.'" Again the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed.'
A vigorous dissent argued that it was
impossible to read Girard's will without reaching the conclusion that
" The case was argued primarily on other grounds. Cy pres was sought
as an alternative remedy. For an excellent discussion of the sociological
implications of Girard and the use of sociologists and political scientists
as expert witnesses in this case, see Gordon, The Girard College Case:
Desegregation and a Municipal Trust, 304 Annals 53 (1956).
" Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956). The court stated
that "to sanction a change in the express terms of the will of Stephen
Girard . . . would, in the opinion of the court, be a wholly unwarranted and
improper decision unjustified by any principle of applicable law." Id. at
569-70, 127 A.2d at 297. See Note, 18 U. PiTT. L. Ruv. 620, 630 (1957).
" Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230
(1957).
19347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 This opinion is not reported.
17 Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
In the
first Girard decision the Pennsylvania court relied heavily on its holding that
the city could legally administer this trust in support of its refusal to apply
the cy pres doctrine. That holding was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court; yet it does not appear that on remand of the case any attempt
was made to revive the cy pres argument; at least the court in their
final disposition of the case did not say so. Even the dissenter failed to make
any reference to cy pres relief. The case was severely criticized in the
reviews. See, e.g., Notes, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 152 (1959); 33 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 495 (1958). A like result was reached on similar facts in Mills v. City
of Philadelphia, 52 N.J. Super. 52, 144 A.2d 728 (Super. Ct. 1958) (cy pres
was not argued). See Note, 39 B.U.L. Ray. 140 (1959); cf. Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
721. But see Moore v. City & County of Denver, 133 Colo. 190, 292 P.2d
986 (1956), decided two years before Girard. In Moore the City of Denver
had been appointed trustee of a trust establishing a college for "poor, white
male orphans"; "orphans" was defined as children whose fathers were dead
(obviously patterned after the Girard trust). Suit was brought to enlarge
the class of beneficiaries since a large surplus had accumulated. Apparently,
no objection was made to the "white" restriction. The court there pointed
out that the plaintiffs had not shown that the testator's directions could not
be observed and that cy pres had no application. There is no reported case
indicating the fate of this trust after the Girard decisions.
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he would have preferred deletion of the word "white" to removal
of the city as trustee. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.18

LaFond v. City of Detroit,9 a later case, involved a will providing for the establishment of a public playground for white children. The city accepted the gift provided the court would construe
the will as giving it the right to make the facilities available to all
children, without regard to race, color or creed. An evenly divided
court affirmed a holding that the trust was void as against public
policy and contrary to the laws of Michigan and the United States.
Exercise of the cy pres power to strike the word "white" was denied
on the ground that the testratrix had not evinced a general charitable
intent.2"

An analysis of the decision in the principal case in the light of
the three cases discussed above indicates four conditions necessary
to success: (1) the court must find that the testator manifested a
"general charitable intent" ;21 (2) there must be some factor beyond
the trustee's control which makes it impossible, impractical or illegal
for him to administer the trust so long as it contains the discriminatory provision ;21 (3) there must be some factor, which may or
" Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570,
rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
"°357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959), noted with approval in Note, 35
NomTE DAME LAw. 277 (1960); disapproved in Note, 37 U. DET. L.J. 418
(1960).
" Three Justices thought the testatrix' primary intent was not to benefit
charity generally but to benefit white children. The dissenters thought that
this position was unwarranted by the evidence and felt that cy pres should
have been exercised to strike the word "white." 357 Mich. at 372, 98
N.W.2d at 535.
1
As pointed out by Professor Bogert, the decisions on general charitable intent are impossible to reconcile. 2A BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4,
at § 437. Given practically identical language in a will, one court will find
the requisite intent while another will hold it to be lacking. This intent
seems to be a fictional disguise for a decision in which considerations of
public policy may outweigh the sanctity of the right of testamentary disposition of property. It is much easier to avoid the weighing of these propositions by finding no "general charitable intent." But even here the court is
often forced to determine that the testator would prefer that his trust fail
rather than have it altered. This seems to be the case in Lafond v. City of
Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959). There is no substantial distinction to be seen in the language of that bequest and that of the principal
case so far as "general charitable intent" is concerned.
" Thus, a distinction is drawn between the trustee who by his own act
creates or contributes toward the impossibility, impracticability or illegality
of the trust and one who merely renders a particular remedy impractical.
See note 24 infra.
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may not be within the trustee's control, which makes the appointment of a substituted trustee impractical, or contrary to the testator's
intent ;23 (4) finally, there must be a finding that administration of
the trust by the designated institutional trustee is the primary object
of the testator 2 4 -otherwise the court will settle the trust on an
institution willing to observe its restrictions.
Although the court in the principal case justified its application
of the cy pres doctrine primarily on grounds of the testator's intent,
it is submitted that public policy would also have been sufficient
grounds for extension of the doctrine in this type of case.25 Application of the cy pres doctrine is certainly preferable to declaring the
trust void as in LaFond, and the almost universal criticism of
Girard indicates that the court's refusal there to delete the racial
2 This condition would seem to be peculiar to colleges or like eleemosynary institutions, for there the benefit to be derived from the trust may have
a dual nature: not only are the eventual recipients of scholarships or loans,
for example, benefitted by the trusts providing them, but the college is
assisted in attracting able students through their existence. And the
testator may have intended to confer both benefits without preference of one
over the other. The court so held in the principal case and refused to make
a choice between them.
"' This would seem to be an extension of the cy pres doctrine to allow
alteration of the trust rather than removal of the trustee where the trustee
is unable to accept the trust as it stands, and it appears that the settlor
selected that particular trustee for more than administrative purposes. In
Connecticut College v. United States, 276 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the
testatrix had devised money to West Point for construction of an alumni
house at a specified location on the campus; the academy wished to use the
money to construct another building. The court refused to apply the cy pres
doctrine, stating that "cy pres. . . does not authorize or permit a court to
vary the terms of a bequest . . . merely because the variation will meet the
,desire or suit the convenience of the trustee. Nor may a trustee by his own
act produce changed conditions which frustrate the donor's intention and still
claim the gift through application of the cy pres doctrine." Id. at 497.
Accord, President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Jewett, 11 F.2d 119
(6th Cir. 1925); Hicks Memorial Christian Ass'n v. Locke, 178 Ark. 892,
12 S.W.2d 866 (1929). But cf. Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 65 A.2d 843
(1949), discussed in Note, 63 HARv. L. Rnv. 348 (1949); Hoffman Estate,
15 Pa. D. & C.2d 295 (Orphans' Ct. 1959); In re MacFarland's Estate, 95
N.Y.S.2d 258 (Surr. Ct. 1950). The court in the principal case dis-tinguished Connecticut College v. United States, supra, on the grounds that
there the impossibility was within the control of the Academy and was actually created by its own act. Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 484, 510, 170
A.2d 39, 47 (1961).
" 5The lower court in the principal case observed that the New Jersey
-anti-discrimination statute had no application to the case since it expressly
,exempted private educational institutions from its provisions. Howard Say.
Inst. v. Trustees of Amherst College, 61 N.J. Super. 119, 160 A.2d 177
(Super. Ct. 1960). See N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, ch. 25, § 5(j) (Supp.
1961).
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Removal of the trustee

designated by the testator will often be more of a subversion of his
intent than altering the trust in other ways. And, as the principal
case indicates, in some circumstances the appointment of substituted
trustees might effectively destroy the main purpose of the trust.
If a state-supported college or university were to receive a
bequest providing scholarships for "white" students only, the Girard
case indicates clearly that the university, being an arm of the state,
could not administer such a trust without violating the fourteenth
amendment. If it be found that the testator intended primarily to
benefit the university by his bequest and that the university refused
to co-operate with a substituted trustee, the principal case seems to
offer a workable and equitable solution. A college receiving a
bequest establishing a trust restricted to a particular race or religion
which it cannot legally or in good conscience administer, should not
to be forced to choose between repudiating it altogether or accepting
it as is, if it may do so at all. Ultimately the problem is resolved
into a balancing of two interests thus brought into conflict: the
interest of the college and the public in making the college's facilities
available to qualified students without regard to race or religion, and
the interest of the testator in the unfettered right to dispose of his
property as he sees fit. 7 In most cases the former should outweigh
the latter, for the advancement of learning and the protection of civil
liberties would seem to be more worthy goals than blind respect
for the supposed intent of the dead hand.
JOSEPH STEVENS FERRELL

Constitutional Law-Inadmissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence
in State Criminal Proceedings
In a recent decision' the United States Supreme Court held that

" See Clark, CharitableTrusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will
of Stephen Girard,66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957), and Notes cited in notes 13 and
17 szpra.
27

See note 21 supra.

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). (Justice Stewart concurred in
result only.) Cleveland police officers, having information that a person
wanted for questioning about some bombings was hiding out in defendant's
home, broke into defendant's home, waving a piece of paper which they
claimed was a warrant, and thoroughly searched the house. During this
search they found the obscene materials, for the possession of which the
defendant, Mrs. Dollree Mapp, was convicted under the provisions of OHIo
REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1961). On trial no search warrant was pro1Mapp
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evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure by state law enforcement officers was inadmissible in a state criminal proceeding. In so
holding the Court expressly overruled Wolf v. Colorado2 which had
definitively established the admissibility of such evidence.
For over fifty years controversy as to whether such evidence
should be admitted has raged incessantly. The many inconsistencies
to be found in the cases with respect to this issue are possibly attributable to the great difficulty in choosing between the two conflicting
values involved: the right to privacy, and the ever-increasing need
for effective law enforcement.'
At common law, any evidence that was competent and relevant
was admissible.4 The view that illegally obtained evidence should
be excluded first arose in 1886 in Boyd v. United States.5 In this
case the Court struck down an act of Congress which provided that
in a revenue case the defendant's failure to produce certain documents when ordered to do so would result in an irrebuttable presumption that the government's allegations were true. The Court concluded that the act was contrary to the fourth amendment and to the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment, although not literally
within the prohibition of either.6 Twenty-eight years later in Weeks
v. United States7 the Court formulated what is now known as the
federal exclusionary rule.8 The Court held that evidence seized
from the petitioner's house by a United States Marshal acting without a warrant was inadmissible in federal courts. The government
argued the common law rule and contended that the evidence was
both competent and relevant. In rejecting this argument the Court
stated that the right of citizens "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures"' was a mere form of words if evidence gathered through
duced, nor was the failure to do so explained by the prosecution. It appeared
that there never was a warrant.
2338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'See generally Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,
and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. RV. 1 (1950).
'8 WIGmom, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8

"And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private

books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself." Id. at 633.
'232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'Now embodied in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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such illegal action by federal officers could be used against them.10
The rule of the Weeks case has been followed unwaveringly in
federal criminal prosecutions."
In 1948, Wolf v. Colorado2 presented a different problem to
the Court: does the Weeks rule operate in a state trial so as to
exclude evidence gained by an unreasonable search and seizure by
state officers? The Court held that it did not. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the majority, stated,
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in
"the concept of ordered society" and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause.'"
The Court pointed out, however, that the means of enforcing the
right were up to the several states. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Black stated that the exclusionary rule "is not a command of
the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence
which Congress might negate."'
Although attacked periodically,
the Wolf rule has been affirmed in subsequent decisions. 15
0 "If letters and documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such search and seizure
is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be striken from the Constitution." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914).
"United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
12338 U.S. 25 (1949).
13Id. at 27-28.
"id. at 39, 40.
"1In Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 17 (1951), the petitioner, relying on
Wolf for the proposition that an illegal search and seizure by state officers
violated the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, sought a
federal injunction against the use in the state court of the seized evidence.
The Court upheld the lower court's refusal to grant the injunction, pointing
out that under Wolf the states can choose to admit or exclude such evidence,
and expressing the Court's reluctance to interfere in state proceedings. Later
by a five-to-four decision in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), the
Court did enjoin a federal agent, who had seized evidence under an invalid
warrant issued by a United States Commissioner, from turning it over to state
officers for use in a state prosecution. The Court said, however, that it was
not interfering with state matters, but merely was exercising its traditional
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Justice Frankfurter, in Lustig v. United States," decided the
same day as Wolf, contributed to legal language the "silver platter

doctrine."

The Court affirmed the previously established rule

that evidence seized by state officers could be turned over on a "silver

platter" to federal agents for federal prosecution, and that such
evidence would be admissible in federal courts. The Weeks rule
would operate only if federal officers were in some way connected

with the seizure.
The silver platter doctrine was adhered to until 1960, when it
was overruled by Rios v. United States1 and Elkins v. United
States.'8 The Court there reasoned that the exclusion of stateseized evidence in federal court would promote federalism by avoiding conflicts between state and federal courts in those states which
have adopted an exclusionary rule, and that no resulting conflict
would occur in those states admitting such evidence. The Court declared that it was merely exercising supervisory power over federal
court procedure and that the states could apply such sanctions against
supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies. The rule of
Stefanelli was approved during the past year in Pugach v. Dollinger, 365
U.S. 458 (1961).
In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), the Court ruled that a state
could use wiretap evidence. In so holding, the Court continued the doctrine
of Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), that mechanical devices
not connected to telephone wires are not covered by the Federal Communications Act, and affirmed the holding of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928), that the fourth amendment does not apply to wiretapping. The
constitutionality of a state statute which permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence was upheld in Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court reversed the
defendant's conviction which had been secured by the use of illegal evidence.
State sheriffs had forced their way into petitioner's room, and as they entered
he put several morphine capsules into his mouth. The police jumped on him
and tried to extract the capsules; unsuccessful, they handcuffed him and
took him to a hospital where his stomach was pumped against his will. The
Court felt that this brutal conduct shocked conscience, and warned that the
states in their prosecutions must respect certain decencies of civilized conduct. Such outrageous conduct was held to violate the Due Process Clause.
Later, however, the Court confined the Rochin decision to its facts by determining in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), that although the
placing by police of a recording device in the defendant's bedroom and listening to his conversations for over a month was "outrageous" conduct, there
had been no invasion of the defendant's physical person nor violence as in
Rochin. (It is interesting to note that in both Stefanelli and Iruine the
lone dissenter was Justice Douglas.)
1 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
'364 U.S. 253 (1960).
(five-to-four decision), discussed in Note, 39
18364 U.S. 206 (1960)
N.C.L. Rv. 193 (1961).
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illegal seizures as they saw fit. But it was stated that the conduct
of a state officer would be judged against fourth amendment standards. The evidence would be inadmissible if obtained by state
officers "during a search which, if conducted by federal officers,
would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. .

.

."

In a

dictum the Court stated that such a standard is required because
the federal rule of exclusion is not a mere rule of evidence, but
rather a constitutional mandate which is part of the fourth amendment, and part of the "right to privacy" guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. This declaration by the Court indicated their dissatisfaction with the double standard expressed in the Wolf decision.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, observed that even though the
majority claimed that it was in no way interfering in state matters, by
judging state officers' conduct by federal standards, their actions were
in fact regulated in so far as federal prosecutions were concerned.
In Mapp v. Ohio2" the Court affirmed the dictum of Elkins.
In holding that the states could no longer admit illegally seized
evidence, Justice Clark, author of the majority opinion, reached
this result by reasoning: (1) that the federal exclusionary rule is of
constitutional origin and is a part and parcel of the fourth amend-,
ment; (2) that in Wolf the underlying core of the fourth amendment, "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police,"2 was held to be applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment; and (3) that the
exclusionary rule, therefore, logically and constitutionally, is enforceable against the states.
This syllogism does not seem to be altogether sound. In Wolf
it was stated that the Weeks rule was not derived from the explicit
requirements of the fourth amendment, but rather that it was an
exercise by the Court of its supervisory power over the federal court
system and that Congress might reject the rule and adopt other
methods for enforcing the guarantees of the fourth amendment.
Even assuming that the rule is of constitutional origin, this
decision is still difficult to justify. The Court has recognized and
has constantly reiterated the fact that the fourteenth amendment does
Id. at 223.
U.S. 643 (1961).
21 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
20367
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not carry the Bill of Rights as such to the states.22 Justice Frank2" observed:
furter, in Adamson v. California,
Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment
into the Constitution and the beginning of the present membership of the Court-a period of seventy years-the scope
of that Amendment was passed upon by forty-three judges.
Of all these judges, only one, who may respectfully be called
an eccentric exception, ever indicated the belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first
eight Amendments....
In this same case Justice Reed, pointing to the necessity of limiting
federal action only by the Bill of Rights, wrote that this position
is consistent with the doctrine of federalism, "by leaving to the states
the responsibility of dealing with the privileges and immunities of
their citizens except those inherent in national citizenship."'2 5
Since the fourth amendment does not literally apply to the
states, the Court justified its decision by reasoning that the exclusionary rule is an integral and inseparable part of the "right to
privacy" which reaches the states through the fourteenth amendment
as an essential ingredient of the "concept of ordered liberty."
The "right to privacy" under the fourteenth amendment is a constitutional guarantee expressed in general terms. The fourth amendment on the other hand is a specific command which is accompanied
by a large body of law defining it. The Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment is a flexible concept; it has been defined by
a case by case process of inclusion and exclusion. The decision in
Mapp, therefore, seemingly amounts to rejection of this flexible
standard as far as the "right to privacy" is concerned and imposition
of the Court's configurations of the fourth amendment upon the states
via the Due Process Clause. Since the "right to privacy" is now
to be construed by employing fourth amendment standards, the
practical result is the same as if the Court had simply stated that
the fourth amendment is carried in toto to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1903).
28332

U.S. 46 (1947).

" Id. at 62 (concurring opinion).
"Id. at 53.
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The majority also argued that their result was necessary because
other methods of enforcing the right of privacy in the states have
proved ineffectual, and the right is valueless without the exclusionary method of enforcing it. In so saying the Court contradicts itself
and admits that the Weeks rule is a method of enforcing a constitutional right and is not itself such a right. Continuing this line of
argument the Court indicated that the trend in the states since the
Weeks case has been toward adoption of its rule. The rule may or
may not be desirable; some authorities think it is illogical to the
point of absurdity."
Even if the rule is a good one, this has no
bearing on the constitutional question involved. A great majority
of the states, either in their constitutions or statutes, have adopted
the fifth amendment provision against self-incrimination, but as to
those states that have provisions of lesser scope, the Court has consistently refused to require literal adoption of the fifth amendment
27
just because it seems desirable.

In an able dissent Justice Harlan pointed to the lack of traditional judicial restraint on the part of the majority. The Ohio
statute under which the defendant was convicted seemed clearly unconstitutional in that it made criminal the mere knowing possession
or control of obscene materials.2 s The petitioner, making no reference to Wolf, advocated only the striking down of this statute. The
only mention of possible reconsideration of the Wolf case was in
the concluding paragraph of the amicus curiae brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union. Justice Harlan felt that such an important
decision should not be made without benefit of full argument.
Good or bad the decision will give rise to many problems. The
2""Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius,
you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall
let you both, go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall
do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of teaching people like
Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the
Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else." 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4,
§2184, at 31 n.l. (Emphasis is by the author.)
2 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Wyman v. De Gregory, 101
N.H. 171, 137 A.2d 512 (1957), appeal dismissed, 360 U.S. 717 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 857 (1959); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 79

(1908).
28

The statute provides: "No person shall knowingly . . . have in his
.. 2.,

possession or under his control an obscene lewd, or lascivious book .
OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1961).
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issue of admissibility of illegally state-seized evidence has appeared
on the average of fifteen times per term during the past three
Supreme Court terms alone; as a result the question of the retroactivity of Mapp will be of major concern in the twenty-four states
that have no exclusionary rule, and in those states which have only
partially adopted the rule.9 North Carolina has adopted the Weeks
rule,"0 but under Elkins and Mapp. in determining whether an
officer's conduct was proper, apparently a federal standard will be
applied.
Justice Black, concurring in the Mapp decision, reversed his
previous position in Wolf where he stated that although he felt
the fourth amendment was enforceable against the states, the exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence only. He justified his present
position by seizing upon the Boyd case for the proposition that
there is a close interrelation between the fourth and fifth amendments
and that introducing illegal evidence is the same as compelling a
person to testify against himself. Thus by applying both amendments to the states the exclusionary rule becomes constitutionally
mandatory.
Justice Harlan indicated the fallacy of this argument. As recently as April 1961, in Cohen v. Hurley,"' the Court once again
rejected the position that the fifth amendment is a limitation on other
than federal action. If the fifth amendment alone does not bind state
action, it logically follows that-the fourth and the fifth together
similarly would not do so.
Justice Black's view that both the fourth and fifth amendments
apply directly to the states would seem to go even farther than
that of the majority, in that they attempted to justify the decision
on the basis of the "right to privacy" under the fourteenth amendment. In effect, however, the majority closely approaches Justice
Black's view because, as previously pointed out, it makes little
difference whether it is said that the fourth amendment as such
applies to the states, or that this "right to privacy" under the
fourteenth amendment will be construed in the light of fourth amendment standards. The end result is the same.
2 For a list of those states which had or had not adopted an exclusionary
rule as of 1960, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1960)
(Appendix
to Opinion -of the Court, Table I).
'0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953); N.C. GN. STAT. § 15-27.1 (Supp.
1959).
31366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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Having taken the first step in determining a state citizen's rights
under the fourteenth amendment by employing one of the Bill of
Rights as the standard, the Court, following this theory to its logical
end, could ultimately make binding upon the states all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. This could occur despite the fact that
it has been consistently held that the right to indictment by a grand
jury,"2 and the prohibitions against double jeopardy 3 and compulsory self-incrimination 4 under the fifth amendment apply only
to federal prosecutions. Similarly under the sixth amendment the
provisions for a speedy 5 and public trial by jury,"0 and the right to
counsel37 in criminal proceedings apply to federal courts only. Now
that the decision in Mapp has opened the door to the enforcement
of provisions of this genus against the states, it is not impossible,
though admittedly unlikely in the immediate future, that federal
standards ultimately will control criminal procedure in the states.
It is submitted that the Court's new policy of supervising state
law enforcement is an unwise one. The great preponderance of the
law enforcement burden lies with the several states. Each state may
have peculiar crime problems. The people in those states make
the laws that govern their police and their courts; they live under
those laws. It is their constitutional right to make such laws, and
they alone should determine what evidence should or should not be
admissible. The Supreme Court of the United States should not
legislate local public policy.
LORAN A. JOHNSON
32 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Martinez v. Southern
Ute Tribe, 151 F. Supp. 476 (D.C. Colo. 1957), aff'd, 249 F.2d 915 (10th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958), rehearing denied, 357 U.S.

924 (1958).

" See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), rehearing denied, 360

U.S. 907 (1959); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

8 See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); United States ex rel.
Rooney v. Ragen, 173 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 961
(1949); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Wyman v. De
Gegory, 101 N.H. 171, 137 A.2d 512 (1957), appeal dismissed, 360 U.S.
717 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 857 (1959).
" Ex parte Whistler, 65 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1945), appeal dismissed,
154 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 797 (1946), rehearing
denied, 327 U.S. 819 (1948).
3
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
81
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

.:
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Criminal Law-Attempted Suicide

At common law suicide was a felony, and attempted suicide was
a misdemeanor.' Suicide was described by Blackstone as a double
offense. He stated:
[T]he law of England wisely and religiously considers that
no man hath a power to destroy life but by commission from
God, the author of it; and as the suicide is guilty of a double
offense, one spiritual, in evading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled
for; the other temporal, against the king, who hath an interest
in the preservation of all his subjects, the law has, therefor e,
ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar
species of felony, a felony committed on one's self.2
A person who committed suicide was punished at common law
by burial in the public highway with a stake driven through his body
and by forfeiture of his goods and chattels to the king.' Attempted
suicide was apparently punished like any other misdemeanor.4 Since
'Rex v. Mann, 110 L.T.R. (n.s.) 781 (Crim. App. 1914); Regina v.
Burgess, Le. & Ca. 258, 169 Eng. Rep. 1387 (Crim. App. 1862); see also 1
HALE P.C. 412 (1778).
24

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*

189 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE].

* 4 BLACKSTONE * 189; CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 557 (6th ed. 1958) ;
MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 272 (1934)

[hereinafter cited as MILLER]. Blackstone stated that this punishment was prescribed to prevent suicide by imposing sanctions on a man's reputation and personal property after his death.
4 BLACKSTONE * 189.
'See May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 519, 64 Atl. 885, 887 (1906); Rex
v. Mann, 110 L.T.R. (n.s.) 781 (Crim. App. 1914); Regina v. Burgess, Le.
& Ca. 258, 169 Eng. Rep. 1387 (Crim. App. 1862).
A point often raised by writers and jurists is whether suicide is murder.
This question is of more than academic interest when it is contended that

attempted suicide is attempted murder. There is a split of authority. That
suicide is murder: Commonwealth v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S.W. 265
(1904); Mikell, Is Suicide Murder?, 3 CoLuM. L. REv. 379, 384 (1903);
MILLER

227. That suicide is not murder: Commonwealth v. Wright, 26 Pa.

County Ct. 666 (1902); Regina v. Burgess, supra. However, attempted
suicide is not attempted murder, and when this theory has been suggested
it has been promptly rejected. Commonwealth v. Wright, supra; Regina
v. Burgess, supra. When punished at all, attempted suicide has uniformly
been punished as an attempted felony rather than as attempted murder. State
v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 At. 44 (Sup. Ct. 1903); State v. LaFayette,
117 N.J.L. 442, 188 At. 918 (C.P. 1937); Rex v. Mann, supra; Regina
v. Burgess, supra.
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punishment by forfeiture is no longer possible,' suicide is not punishable today.
In State v. Willis' the defendant was indicted for attempted
suicide. At the trial, however, the defendant's motion to quash
the indictment because it failed to state a crime was sustained. The
state appealed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously
reversed, holding that suicide and attempted suicide are misdemeanors in North Carolina.'
The court reached its decision by relying entirely on the common law since there were no statutes directly bearing on the subject.
The court reasoned that the common law is in effect in North Carolina except where abrogated or repealed ;' that suicide and attempted
suicide were crimes at common law; therefore, suicide and attempted
suicide are crimes in North Carolina.9
The case law on suicide and attempted suicide is in conflict.
North Carolina is the second state to hold attempted suicide to be a
crime on a purely common law basis. New Jersey has twice upheld
convictions for attempted suicide.Y Both cases were decided on the
same reasoning as the principal case." Indiana and Iowa have held
that attempted suicide is not a crime because they have no common
'E.g., Mo. CONST. art. I, § 30; N.C. CosT. art. II, § 1.
'255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961).
'The court concluded that suicide was probably a misdemeanor because of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1 (1953), which provides: "A felony is a crime which
is or may be punishable by either death or imprisonment in the State's
prison. Any other crime is a misdemeanor." Therefore, attempted suicide is
an attempted misdemeanor, which is punishable as a misdemeanor.

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 4-1 (1953).

' The court stated that such collateral consequences of suicide as aiding
another to commit suicide and accidently killing another while attempting to
commit suicide would not be punished in a jurisdiction in which suicide is not
a crime in the absence of statute. McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So.
89 (1910); State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1933); Grace
v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. App. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902). It is likely that this
idea influenced the court in making its decision. However, in at least two
cases these collateral consequences have been punished on the ground that
suicide was unlawful, and the defendant was thus engaged in an unlawful
act, although neither suicide nor attempted suicide was a crime in the particular jurisdiction. Wallace v. State, 232 Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (1953);
Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877).
"0State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 Atl. 44 (Sup. Ct. 1903); State v.
LaFayette, 117 N.J.L. 442, 188 Atl. 918 (C.P. 1937).
" Attempted suicide is now a crime by statute in New Jersey. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 170-25.6 (Supp. 1960). The statute reads: "Any person who
attempts to commit suicide is a disorderly person."
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law offenses, and there is no statute making it an offense. 2 Pennsylvania has also held that attempted suicide is not a crime.' 3
The Massachusetts court has formulated one of the most interesting rules in this area. In Commonwealth v. Dennis4 the court
held that attempted suicide was not a crime in Massachusetts because
the Massachusetts statute punishing attempts 5 was based entirely
upon the punishment for the crime attempted. Since suicide itself
could not be punished, attempted suicide could not be. The court
reluctantly followed this doctrine in Commonwealth v. Mink,'
stating that the legislature had intentionally or inadvertently left
attempted suicide without punishment.17 Maine followed the
Massachusetts rule in May v. Pennell." Twelve other states have
statutes similar to the Maine and Massachusetts statutes.

9

There-

fore, if confronted with the problem, and if the established case law
was followed, these states would also hold that attempted suicide
was not a crime.
Six states have statutes providing that attempted suicide is a
1 State v. Wallace, 232 Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (1953) (suicide is not
a crime but is unlawful); State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717
(1933)

(suicide is neither a crime nor unlawful).

In addition to Indiana

and Iowa, Hawaii and Wisconsin have neither common law offenses nor a
statute making suicide unlawful. See HAWAII REv. LAWS § 1-1 (1955);

§ 939.10 (1958).
In the principal case the North Carolina court pointed out that unless
suicide is a crime, attempted suicide cannot be. Following this reasoning
three states have precluded attempted suicide from being a crime because
all three have specifically stated that suicide itself is not a crime. Tate v.
Canonica, 5 Cal. Rep. 28, 33 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (dictum); Blackburn v.
State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872) (dictum); Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim.
App. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902). Illinois has.implied by way of dictum that
attempted suicide is a crime but has firmly stated that suicide itself is not.
Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 204 Ill. 549, 566-67, 68 N.E. 492, 498 (1903).
But this seems contradictory since it was pointed out in the principal case
is a crime, the attempt cannot be.
that unless the act attempted
" Commonwealth v. Wright, 26 Pa. County Ct. 666 (1902).
" 105 Mass. 162 (1870).
1 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 274, § 6 (1956).
" 123 Mass. 422 (1877).
" It would seem that the legislature intended this result since the same
is still on the books eighty-four years later.
statute
8 101 Me. 516, 64 Atl. 885 (1906).
" ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 65-2-5 (1949); CAL. PENAL CODE § 664;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.04 (1944) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-101 (1949) ;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 610-27 (Supp. 1960); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 556.150
(1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4711 (1947) ; N.H. RBv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 590:5, :6 (1955); OiE. REV. STAT. § 161.090 (1959); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-1-31 (1953); VT. STAT . ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN.
Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 6120 (1955).
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crime.2" Although these statutes, with the exception of the New
Jersey statute which was adopted in 1960, were enacted in the early
part of this century, no reported cases arising under them have been
found.
New York enacted an attempted suicide statute 2 ' which, because
of the strong criticism by other jurisdictions22 and by writers, 23 was
repealed in 1919.
Just a few months before the North Carolina court rendered its
24
decision in the principal case, England passed a new suicide act
which provides that suicide and attempted suicide are no longer
crimes. This action was preceded by a tremendous wave of criticism
from the public, legal writers, the Magistrates' Association and the
British Medical Association.25 The actual statistics on how the
crime was treated aroused the ire of some writers. One pointed
out that in 1956 there were 5,387 cases of attempted suicide, but only
613 persons were prosecuted; and only thirty-three were actually
sent to prison. 26 Another writer revealed that the Home Office
instructions to police were not to prosecute unless a court order was
the only means of providing refuge or asylum. This discretion, he
added, explained why few prosecutions were brought. The writer,
however, was highly critical of leaving such discretion to the police
27
in such a delicate matter.

It is submitted that as a matter of public policy the decision in the
principal case is highly questionable. Its only effect will be to make
suicidal attempts more successful," and it probably will not even
2
"NEv. REV. STAT. §202.495 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:170-25.6
(Supp. 1960); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-33-02 (1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 812 (1958); S.D. CODE § 13.1903 (1939); WASH. REV. CODE
(1961).
§ 9.80.020
21
N.Y. Laws 1919, ch. 414, § 1.

22 May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 Atl. 885 (1906); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 26 Pa. County Ct. 666 (1902).
" E.g, Larremore, Suicide and the Law, 17 HARV. L. Rnv. 331, 340
(1904).
" See 1961 CRIm. L.R. 591.
"See 103 SOL. J. 821 (1959); 1958 ScoTs L.T. 141.
1958 ScoTs L.T. 141, 143.
Attempted suicide is not a crime in Scot2 103 SOL. J. 821, 822 (1959).
land. 1958 ScoTs L.T. 141, 143. It is also not a crime in France, Spain,
Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Norway or Denmark. 125 JUST. P. 240, 241-

42 (1961).
2

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162 (1870); Commonwealth v.

Wright, 26 Pa. County Ct. 666 (1902).
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discourage a second attempt by the same person.9
leading authority on criminal law :30

As stated by a

When a man is in the act of taking his own life there
seems to be little advantage in having the law say to him:
"You will be punished if you fail." ...
What is done to him
will not tend to deter others because those bent on selfdestruction do not expect to be unsuccessful. It is doubtful
whether anything is gained by treating such conduct as a
crime.
LAWRENCE

T.

HAMMOND, JR.

Criminal Law-Homicide--Death Resulting More Than a Year and a
Day After Assault
In Commonwealth v. Ladd,' indictments for murder and manslaughter alleged that the defendant struck the victim on September
21, 1958, and that the victim died as a result of this assault on
November 1, 1959. The defendant moved to quash the indictments,
contending that at common law there could be no criminal responsibility for a killing where the death ensued more than a year and a day
after the stroke.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that these
motions to quash were properly overruled. The majority reasoned
that the common law "year and a day" rule was not part of the
definition of murder, but only a rule of evidence or procedure. After
determining that the rule was evidentiary in nature, the court asserted
that it was within the judicial province to abolish the rule in light
of the advancement of scientific medicine in determining cause of
death.3 Consequently, the majority held that the indictments were
not fatal and did properly charge the crimes of murder and manslaughter. A vehement dissent charged that the abolition of the
° See Larremore, supra note 23, at 331.
(1957).
1402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960).
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1960), does not define murder,
0

' PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 68

but merely divides murder into degrees and provides punishments. The
Pennsylvania courts have construed this absence of statutory definition as

giving murder its common law meaning. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa.
500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 74 A.2d
125 (1950).
"[W]e may change a common-law rule of evidence without being guilty
of judicial legislation, and abolish it when we are aware that modern conditions have moved beyond it and left it sterile." Commonwealth v. Ladd,
402 Pa. 164, 175, 166 A.2d 501, 507 (1960).
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rule was unwarranted judicial legislation because the year and a day
4
rule was firmly imbedded in the common law definition of murder.
In order to determine the genesis of and the reasons for the year
and a day rule, an examination of its common law development is
necessary. At common law there were three methods of dealing with
murder and manslaughter,' and in each form of action death within
a year and a day after the stroke was an important element. One
method was the inquisition against deodands whereby an action was
brought to forfeit to the king the personal chattels used by the assailant in making the assault.6 The rule applied in these cases was that
if the party assaulted did not die within a year and a day after the
assault there could be no forfeiture, for after that time it was con7
clusively presumed that death resulted from some other cause.
A second form of action was the appeals of death. This was a
private process for the punishment of public crimes where a private
subject accused another of some heinous crime.8 During the time
that appeals of death were allowed, the Statute of Gloucester'
was enacted. It provided that an appeal for murder should not be
abated if the victim died within a year and a day after the assault.
This statute was construed as requiring that the appeal be brought
within a year and a day after the completion of the felony by the
death of the victim."0 Thus construed, the statute seems to have
been a statute of limitations since it dealt with the time in which
"Id. at 201, 166 A.2d at 520.
For an excellent and detailed analysis of the three forms of common law

action dealing with murder and manslaughter, see Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R.
v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894). See also Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa.
164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960) ; Note, 19 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 181 (1941).
' The personal chattels which were used by the assailant were forfeited
to the king "to be applied to pious uses, and distributed in alms by his high
almoner." 1 BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *

300 [hereinafter cited as

BLACK-

STONE].

" "The law does not look upon such wound as the cause of a man's death
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 75 (8th
Curwood ed. 1824) [hereinafter cited as HAWKINS].
after which he lives so long."

'The appeal of death had its origin in the Germanic custom of allowing
a private pecuniary satisfaction called a "weregild" to be paid to the injured

party or his relatives. This private process continued in order to insure
infliction of punishment 'upon the offender, although the offenses were no
longer redeemable. 4 BLACKSTONE * 313. These appeals could be brought
prior to an indictment and if the defendant was acquitted he could not be
later tried in a public prosecution for the same offense. 4 BLACKSTONE * 315.

' 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 9. The appeal of death was abolished as a form of

action in England by statute in 1819. Act to Abolish Appeals, 1819, 59
Geo. 3, c. 46.
10 4 BLACKSTONE * 315.
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the private appeal might be initiated. However, through transition,
and perhaps misinterpretation, the year and a day limitation on the
right to prosecute an appeal became a substantial element of criminal homicide."
The third form of action was the public prosecution in the name
of and on behalf of the king. With the advent of criminal jurisdiction in the King's Court it became well established that no one was
criminally responsible for a homicide if the victim lived beyond a
year and a day from the infliction of the fatal stroke. 2 The apparent
reason for the rule was the uncertainty of medical science in fixing
the cause of death due to the long lapse of time between injury and
death. 3
The firm establishment of this rule in the common law probably
explains its widespread adoption and application throughout this
country. With the exception of New York,'4 and now Pennsylvania,
all courts which have considered the question have held that the year
and a day rule must prevail.'" Eleven states have expressly adopted
the rule by legislative enactment.' 6 In states where there are statutes
" For discussions of this statute as -one of limitations and its transition

into an element of criminal homicide, see Notes, 19 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 181
(1941); 65 Dicx. L. RV. 166 (1961).

" Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) ; Common-

wealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 175, 166 A.2d 501, 507 (1960)
opinion); 4 BLACKSTONE

197; 3

(concurring

COKE, INsrrruTEs 47 (1817) [hereinafter
cited as COKE]; 10 HAsLsRy, LAws OF ENGLAND, Criminal Law § 1349
(3d ed. 1955); HAWKxNS 93. The reason for the extra day was stated by
*

Lord Coke: "[For] regularly the law makes no fraction of a day: and the
day was added, that there might be a whole year at least after the stroke." 3
COKE 53.

" Coke gave the reason for the rule: "[F]or if he die after that time, it

cannot be discerned, as the law presumes, whether he died of the stroke, or
poison ... or of a natural death; and in the case of life the rule of law ought

to be certain." 3 COKE 53. See also The King v. Dyson, [1908] 2 K.B. 454,

where the court held that if death did not ensue within a year and a day
after the injury was inflicted the death must be attributed to some other
cause than the blow.
"People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v.
Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y. Supp. 86 (1933). The New York court
reasoned that the common law rule was abrogated by the New York statute
defining murder which omitted mention of the year and a day rule. The

omission was construed as legislative intent for its non-application. These

cases provoked widespread comment. Notes, 4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 86
(1934); 19 MINN. L. RFv. 240 (1935); 10 Wis. L. REv. 112 (1934).
" E.g., Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); People
v. Corder, 306 Ill. 264, 137 N.E. 845 (1922); State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 678,
134 N.E. 481 (1922); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App.
1959). See generally Annot, 20 A.L.R. 1006 (1922).
" ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-458 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2210
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creating, but not defining, the crimes of murder and manslaughter
the year and a day rule has been held applicable with the aid of the
common law.' 7
Although the great weight of authority supports the application
and existence of the rule, there is a sharp conflict as to its nature.
The question resulting in this division of opinion is whether the rule
is one of evidence or procedure, or whether it is a substantive element within the definition of murder. Those cases holding that the
rule is evidentiary in nature reason that no evidence is admissible to
show cause of death when a year and a day elapse between injury
and death." Those cases holding that the rule is substantive reason
that the rule is part of the definition of murder and unless death
occurs within a year and a day there is no crime charged." Perhaps
the best reasoned solution is found in the recent case of Elliott v.
Mills20 where the court termed the rule both substantive and evidentiary, and suggested that in a criminal action death within a year
and a day must be both pleaded (by indictment) and proved.2
The majority in the Ladd case reasoned that merely classifying
the rule as evidentiary would serve as a sound basis for its abolition.
(1947) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 194; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-9 (1953) ;
DE. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 573 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4008 (1948);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 365 (Supp. 1960); MONT. IEV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-2509 (1947); NEv. IEv. STAT. tit. 16, § 200.100 (1957); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12-27-27 (1959) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-7 (1953). See also
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-30-7.4 (Supp. 1960).

" E.g., State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 678, 134 N.E. 981 (1922); State v.
Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 611 (1940); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 104
(Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
" E.g., Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 241 (1894)
(dictum); People v. Clark, 106 Cal. App. 2d 271, 235 P.2d 56 (1951) ; Head
v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17

(1876).

See also

PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW

605 (1957), where the author

in discussing the year and a day rule said: "Unless the death occurs within
this period after the wound . . . the law conclusively presumes that the loss
of life was due entirely to other causes and will not hear evidence to the
contrary."
" E.g., State v. Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1940); People v.
Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 105, 191 N.E. 850, 852 (1934) (dictum); Hardin
v. State, 4 Tex. Cr. App. R. 335 (1878); State v. Spadoni, 137 Wash. 684,
243 Pac. 854 (1926). Indictment for murder omitting this essential element
of murder does not charge a crime. Alderson v. State, 196 Ind. 22, 145 N.E.
572 (1924).
"335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
" This reasoning seems to suggest that the rule is substantive because it
has the effect of incorporating the year and a day rule into the definition of
murder as one of the essential elements of the crime that must be proved as
well as alleged.
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It should be noted that no other court classifying the rule as evidentiary has abolished it. 2 On the contrary, other courts have
reluctantly followed the rule, reasoning that its abolition is a matter
for the legislature."
In an early North Carolina case 24 the court recognized and applied the rule in holding that an indictment which did not specify
when the victim died after receiving a wound was fatally defective.
The court reasoned that "if death did not take place within a year
and a day of the time of receiving the wound, the law draws the
conclusion that it was not the cause of death; and neither the court
nor jury can draw a contrary one."' 25 While this language apparently treats the rule as evidentiary, Chief Justice Ruffin's opinion
in a later case26 seems to align North Carolina with those states
holding that the rule is part of the substantive definition of murder:
[I]t must appear on the bill that the day of the death, as laid,
is within a year and a day from that of the wounding. For,
if it is not so laid, the indictment does not charge murder,
as the law attributes the death, not happening within a year
and a day, to some other cause than the wounding.'
The early North Carolina cases recognized the year and a day
rule while passing on the sufficiency of indictments containing vague
language as to the time of death.2 The writer could not find that
the question of the applicability of the rule has ever been presented
in North Carolina when, on the facts, the death occurred more than
a year and a day after an assault. In all the North Carolina cases
discussing the rule, the question has been raised in connection with
the sufficiency of the indictment.
G.S. § 15-144, enacted in 1887, provides that indictments for
murder and manslaughter containing the allegations set out in the
statute will be sufficient.2 9 Conspicuously absent from the prescribed
222

See cases cited note 18 supra,.

"[U]nder the present law there is no other alternative ....

On the

question of the year and a day rule, our hands are tied." Elliott v. Mills,
335 P.2d 1104, 1114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (concurring opinion).
v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139 (1826).
'State
2
Id. at 141.
State v. Shepherd, 30 N.C. 195 (1847).
7
1d. at 198. (Emphasis added.)
"State v. Haney, 67 N.C. 467 (1872); State v. Baker, 46 N.C. 267
(1854) ; State v. Shepherd, 30 N.C. 195 (1847) ;' State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139
(1826).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-144 (i953).
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allegations is the the requirement of an allegation that the death
occurred within a year and a day. In State v. Pate,3 0 decided
within a few years after the enactment of this statute, an indictment
for murder was drawn in the statutory form, alleging only that the
date of the murder was December 5, 1896. The evidence at the
trial showed that the victim was wounded on this date, but did not
die until some seventy hours thereafter. On appeal, the court held
that the indictment was drawn within the form prescribed by the
statute and was sufficient to charge murder, and that there was
satisfactory proof that death occurred within a year and day.
However, even though an indictment drawn in the form prescribed by G.S. § 15-144 is sufficient, this does not have the effect of
removing death within a year and a day from among the essential
elements of homicide that must be proved to establish criminal
responsibility within the common law definition of murder. The
legislature has provided that the common law is in full force and effect
unless abrogated or repealed.3 ' G.S. § 14-17 merely divides murder
into degrees and provides the punishments therefor. 2 It does not
provide a new definition of murder but permits the definition to
remain as it was at common law. 3 Therefore, it seems clear
that the ancient year and a day rule remains in effect in North
Carolina today, except for the requirement that it be' alleged in the
indictment.
It is conceded that the majority in the Ladd case was motivated
by good practical reasoning when considering that the advancement
of medical science has rendered the year and a day rule obsolete.
However, the abolition of the rule by judicial determination is
questionable in view of its firm entrenchment in the common law and
widespread acceptance in this country. The better reasoned holding
appears in Elliott v. Mills3 4 where the Oklahoma court was faced
with essentially the same question as that presented in Ladd. The
court in Elliott refused to abolish the rule, reasoning that its abolition was a matter for the legislature.
Legal writers have termed the rule "a purely mechanical test""B
" 121 N.C. 659, 28 S.E. 354 (1897).
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953).
8 State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 56 S.E.2d 649 (1949); State v. Dalton,
178 N.C. 779, 101 S.E. 548 (1919).
"'335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
" PEKINS, op. cit. supra note 18, at 605.
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and an "arbitrary rule"3 6 and judicial opinions have joined in assailing the rule as archaic.17 The cause of death can now be accurately
fixed by competent medical testimony, whereas at the time of the
rule's inception the cause of death after more than a year and a day
was speculative.3" It is a curious irony that medical science has
advanced to the point that it may prolong life for long periods and
yet this miraculous advance could very well serve to exonerate a
murderer by simply prolonging his victim's life.
It is submitted that the legislature should take notice of this
ancient rule in light of current day medical standards and enact legislation abolishing it. Many forms of legislation have been discussed,3 9
but a positive repudiation of the rule would best serve the ends of
justice. The rights of the accused would still be adequately protected, since the prosecution would still have the burden of proving
causation beyond a reasonable doubt. A positive repudiation of the
rule would serve to leave the issue of cause of death to the triers of
fact, rather than to a legal presumption forged some seven hundred
years ago that has long outlived its merit, logic and basis.
CARTER G.

MACKIE

Criminal Law-Split Sentence-Trial Judge in North Carolina Not
Permitted To Impose Sentence Active in Part and Suspended in Part
The first probation law was enacted in Massachusetts in 1878;1
since that time changes in the philosophy of criminal punishment
have resulted in widespread use by courts of the suspended sentence.
The exact frequency of use of this type sentence is difficult to ascertain because adequate statistical information is not compiled in a
large majority of the states. Figures complied by the Federal
CRimFEs 536 (6th ed. 1958).
Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943) (should be adjusted by the legislature to conform to medical standards) ; Elliott v. Mills,
335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (rule has run the "limit of its.
logic"); The King v. Dyson, [1908] 2 K.B. 454 (doubts present day merits.
of the rule).
8 See Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959)
(concurring opinion), where it was pointed out that at the time of the formulation of the rule, life expectancy was not more than thirty-four years, while
today, expectancy is about sixty-nine years. Also, at the time of the rule's
CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF

inception medical science was in its infancy.
"'Id.at 1115.

'Mass.

Acts 1878, ch. 198.

See generally BARNES & TEETERS,

HoIzoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 554 (3d ed. 1959).

NEW
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Bureau of Prisons, however, reveal that approximately forty-two
per cent of the federal offenders sentenced in 1957 were placed on
probation.2
Since reformation of the criminal, and his ultimate return as a
useful member of society, is recognized as a dominant purpose of
criminal punishment, judges are becoming increasingly cognizant
that the suspended sentence often can work wonders in rehabilitation.
Probation assigns the criminal to the community, rather than to
prison, for the corrective period. A second chance to remain among
law-abiding citizens and to demonstrate habits that meet the approval
of society oftentimes will do more to bring about this desired
reformation than will a lengthy period behind prison walls. Especially is this true in the case of first-time or youthful offenders.
Early in the development of suspension and probationary practices considerable disagreement occurred among courts as to whether
power to suspend sentences existed independently of statute.3 The
United States Supreme Court reached the conclusion that such power
was not inherent in common law courts ;4 nevertheless, a respectable
minority of jurisdictions never subscribed to that view.5 North
Carolina early espoused the minority position that power to suspend
or respite a sentence was lodged as of common right in every tribunal
possessing jurisdiction to try criminal cases. 6
Accordingly the suspended sentence was utilized in North Carolina as early as 1894; in 1937, however, the legislature accorded
statutory sanction to the practice 7 and also authorized imposition of
BARNES & TEETERs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 561.
See generally Grinnel, The Conmwon Law History of Probation, 32 J.
CnIm.. L. 15 (1941).
"Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
'E.g., Belden v. Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 91 Atl. 369 (1914); People v.
Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 121 N.W. 497 (1909) ; Matter of Hart, 29 N.D. 38,
149 N.W. 568 (1914); State ex rel. Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430,
82 At. 424 (1911); People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y.
2

288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894); Weber v. State, 58 Ohio St. 616, 51 N.E. 116
(1898).
'E.g,

State v. Everitt, 164 N.C. 399, 79 S.E. 274 (1913); State v.

Hilton, 151 N.C. 687, 65 S.E. 1011 (1909).

Power to suspend sentence was

expressly held to exist in the various inferior courts of the state as well as in

the superior courts. State v. Tripp, 168 N.C. 150, 83 S.E. 630 (1914).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1953). The statute provides: "After conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere for any offense, except a crime
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge of any court of record
with criminal jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution of a

sentence and place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine and also
place the defendant on probation."
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certain terms of probation.' Consistent with the express language
employed, in this later statutory provision, the enumerated probationary conditions have been held to be "cumulative and concurrent
rather than exclusive."'
Thus, though good behavior is the condition most commonly attached, 0 the trial judge has wide discretion
in selection of probationary conditions," and the terms imposed
generally have been approved unless considered to be unreasonable,
2
unenforceable, or oppressive.'
It should be noted that the granting of a suspended sentence may affect
a defendant's rights respecting appeal of a criminal conviction. Since an
order suspending a sentence is favorable to the defendant, his consent to
its entry is implied ifhe does not appeal immediately. By this consent his
right to appeal on the principal issue of his guilt or innocence islost. He
may not thereafter complain that his conviction was without due process of
law; however, he may contest evidence showing a breach of conditions and
also raise the question of their reasonableness. State v.Miller, 225 N.C.
213, 34 S.E.2d 143 (1945).
8
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (Supp. 1959). The statute provides: "The
court shall determine and may impose, by order duly entered, and may at any
time modify the conditions of probation and may include among them the
following, or any other; that the probationer shall: (1) Avoid injurious or
vicious habits; (2)Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character; (3)Report to the probation officer as directed; (4)Permit the probation officer to visit at his home or elsewhere; (5)Work faithfully at suitable, gainful employment as far as possible and save his earnings above
his reasonably necessary expenses; (6) Remain within a specified area;
(7) Deposit with the clerk of the court a bond for his appearance at such
time or times as the court may direct; (8) Deposit with the clerk of the
court from his earnings a savings account insuch installments and at such
intervals as the court may direct; and the clerk shall thereupon deposit such
funds in the savings account in an institution whose accounts are insured
by an agency of the federal government and the principal plus interest
earned shall be paid to the probationer upon his discharge or earlier upon
order of the court; (9)Pay a fine in one or several sums as directed by
the court; (10) Make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the
damage or loss caused by his offense, inan amount to be determined by the
court; (11) Support his dependents."
' State v.Simmington, 235 N.C.612, 614, 70 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1952).
"°E.g., State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E.2d 508 (1951); State v.
Peterson, 228 N.C. 736, 46 S.E.2d 852 (1948); State v. Sullivan, 227 N.C.
680, 44 S.E.2d 81 (1947); State v. Marsh, 225 N.C. 648, 36 S.E.2d 244
(1945).
1
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 243 N.C. 754, 92 S.E.2d 177 (1956) (defendant not to allow others to remain at her home after dark); State v.
Thomas, 236 N.C. 196, 72 S.E.2d 525 (1952) (defendant's car confiscated
and sold); State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E.2d 495 (1950) (defendant
prohibited from driving car for a year); State v.Pelley, 221 N.C. 487, 20
S.E.2d 850 (1942) (cease publication of material pertaining to stock sales) ;
State v. Smith, 196 N.C. 438, 146 S.E. 73 (1929) (talk about young girls
only ina complimentary manner).
"E.g., State v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213, 34 S.E.2d 143 (1945); State v.
Shepherd, 187 N.C. 609, 122 S.E. 467 (1924).
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Despite the overwhelming acceptance that employment of the
suspended sentence has gained, one particular variant of it, commonly designated a split sentence, has produced wide divergence of
opinion respecting its validity. The term has been employed by
courts to denote entirely different situations. For example, the
Maine court has used it to describe a sentence where a penalty of both
fine and imprisonment was initially imposed and where imprisonment
was suspended upon enforcement of the fine.13 On the other hand,
in North Carolina the term has been applied to instances where
the trial judge sought to make active in part and to suspend in part
the period of imprisonment inflicted. 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court first considered the propriety of this type of judgment in State v. Lewis."5 Two defendants
were convicted of assault on a female with intent to commit rape.
The trial judge, after pronouncing sentence of four years in prison,
stipulated that they should be released upon serving two years and
be placed on probation for a five year period. On appeal the form
of the judgment was not objected to by the defendants ;1" nevertheless, the court, apparently on its own motion, came to grips with the
issue of the validity of the split sentence. The court stated: "We do
not doubt the wisdom and salutary effect of a judgment of this kind,
but we can find no authority for its rendition."' 1
Although it recognized that power to suspend sentence existed
both inherently and through statutory authorization, the court was
of the opinion that suspension applied, at least where the sole punishment was imprisonment, only to the sentence as a whole. 8 In
striking down the judgment, the court regarded the split sentence in
" Cote v. Cummings, 126 Me. 330, 138 Ati. 547 (1927). The Maine court
took the position that a court cannot suspend a sentence of imprisonment
and enforce a fine imposed as part of the sentence. This result could not
be reached in North Carolina since payment of a fine as a condition of
suspension of sentence is expressly authorized by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-199 (Supp. 1959).
" State v. Lewis, 226 N.C. 249, 37 S.E.2d 691 (1946).
15226 N.C. 249, 37 S.E2d 691 (1946).
Brief for
1" None of the defendants' exceptions touched on this point.
Appellants, pp. 1-6, State v. Lewis, supra note 15.
17226 N.C. at 251, 37 S.E.2d at 693.
"It is true that the North Carolina statute which provides for suspension
and probation, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1953), does not expressly stipulate whether trial judges have authority to suspend only part of a sentence.
See note 7 supra. However, when two separate offenses are involved, as in
the case of breaking and entering and larceny, it is common to require service

of sentence for one of the two counts and suspend sentence on the other.
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effect as an anticipatory parole which constituted an invasion of the
power of pardon, parole and discharge vested in the governor by the
constitution."9 The rule thus formulated in Lewis was vigorously
reapproved by the court in a later case.20
It is interesting to note that in Moore v. Patterson.,2' a case decided three years before Lewis, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reached a diametrically opposed result respecting the validity of the
split sentence; this holding was grounded on construction of a
statutory provision2 2 virtually identical in its terms to the North
Carolina suspension and probation statute.' The defendant had been
sentenced to three years for a felony, and the trial judge had provided
that after he served one year the balance of the prison term be
suspended and that he then be placed on probation for three years.
The court upheld the judgment, reasoning that the legislature did
not intend to limit the judge's discretion by allowing them to suspend
only entire sentences. It is possible that, had argument concerning
the split sentence been presented in State v. Lewis, Moore would
have been cited and the interpretation of the similar statute considered by the North Carolina court.
Surveying the question of validity of the split sentence on a
nationwide basis, there seems to be a paucity of authority touching
the point in most of the states.24 Further, in those jurisdictions
where the issue has been directly presented the over-all situation
"°N.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 6 (1868): "The Governor shall have the power
to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all
offenses (except in cases of impeachment), upon such conditions as he
may think proper, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law
relative to the manner of applying for pardons. He shall biennially communicate to the General Assembly each case of reprieve, commutation, or
pardon granted, stating the name of each convict, the crime for which he
was convicted, the sentence and its date, the date of commutation, pardon,
or reprieve, and the reasons therefor."
The court in Lewis conceded that it would be difficult to find in the
split sentence any direct conflict with the constitution; still it was deemed
to be within the spirit of that instrument to leave such matters entirely to the
chief
executive. 226 N.C. at 251, 37 S.E.2d at 693.
20 In
re Powell, 241 N.C. 288, 84 S.E.2d 691 (1954).
21203 S.C. 90, 26 S.E.2d 319 (1943).
"2 S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-591 (1952).
The court's decision was based
squarely on the language of the statute. Unlike North Carolina, South Carolina has never adopted the view that power to suspend sentences inheres in
courts possessing criminal jurisdiction. Moore v. Patterson, 203 S.C. 90, 93,
26 S.E.2d
319, 321 (1943).
22
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1953). See note 7 szpra.
" See Annot., 147 A.L.R. 656 (1943).
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.generally has not been parallel to the consideration of the problem
presented by the North Carolina and South Carolina cases. "
Several considerations indicate that should this issue be presented
afresh the North Carolina Supreme Court might wish to re-examine
the reasoning of the Lewis case. Firstly, the court in deciding
Lewis did not allude to the language employed in G.S. § 15-197.

Seemingly a statutory provision authorizing suspension of sentence
in full would necessarily be broad enough in its terms to permit
suspension of part of the sentence. Further, judicial release of a
prisoner after he has begun serving his sentence is not a unique
concept in North Carolina;2 thus, allowance of the split sentence
would not seem to be an unwarranted extension of judicial power.
Secondly, a constitutional amendment adopted subsequent to any
decision on the validity of the split sentence divested the governor
of the parole power and placed it in a board of paroles created by the
legislature.17 This action removed the precise ground of constitutional objection manifested in Lewis to the split sentence. Although the same type of adverse argument might be put forward in
relation to the new constitutional provision, analysis reveals that
" California by express statutory provision vests trial judges with
authority to impose a sentence of imprisonment as a condition for subsequent
probation. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203, 1203.1. Kentucky has disallowed
imposition of the split sentence. Woll v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith,
284 Ky. 783, 146 S.W.2d 59 (1940). It should be noted, however, that
in this jurisdiction the jury fixes the term of confinement. Louisiana has
refused to allow the judge to provide at the time sentence is imposed that
the prisoner be released on probation after serving a fixed period of the
prescribed term. However, after the prisoner is incarcerated and actually has
begun to serve the sentence, the judge may suspend on good behavior. State
v. Johnson, 220 La. 64, 55 So. 2d 782 (1951). The split sentence is precluded in New York by a statutory provision that imprisonment cannot be
interrupted once it has commenced.

N.Y. CoNsoL. LAws ANN. art. 196,

§2188 (McKinney Supp. 1961). Oklahoma has held that suspension, if
granted, must apply to the entire judgment. State v. Smith, 83 Okla. Cr.
188, 174 P.2d 932 (Crim. Ct. App. 1946). Oregon has denied use of the
split sentence on the ground that it was an encroachment upon the powers of
the governor and the parole board. Rightnour v. Gladdin, 219 Ore. 342k
347 P.2d 103 (1959).
" An early case, State v. Whitt, 117 N.C. 804, 23 S.E. 452 (1895), held
that even though the defendant had served six days of a term of imprisonment, the trial judge still could suspend sentence if such change were made
during the term of court in which the defendant had been convicted. This
rule has been preserved in later decisions. E.g., State v. Gross, 230 N.C.
734, 55 S.E.2d 517 (1949).
2T
N.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 6. This amendment terminated the governor's
parole power as of July 1, 1955, and subsequently vested it in a board of
paroles.
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the allowance of this type sentence would not in any degree diminish
the power of the parole board. In instances where sentence is
suspended in its entirety the parole board does not become involved
in the matter at all. Should the split sentence be utilized there
seems to be no sound reason why the parole board could not act
once the prisoner is incarcerated exactly as it would in any other
case. By statute 8 a prisoner is eligible for consideration for parole
upon completing service of one-fourth of the sentence imposed. The
parole board's action should be on the basis of the entire sentence,
however, and not merely on just the active part. If parole were
granted before the expiration of the active term the effect would be
cancellation of the remaining conditions imposed by the court. 29
It should be remembered that both the judge and the parole board
are working toward the same objective-the prisoner's ultimate
return as a useful member of society. The judge's action when he
imposes sentence is prospective; the parole board's action when it
reviews the prisoner's record and considers parole is retrospective.
The latter complements the former and serves as a safeguard against
the court's mistakes.
The usefulness of the split sentence as a working tool in the
hands of the trial judge is instantly apparent. He has first-hand
knowledge of all the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular case. In fixing punishment he usually will consider the nature
of the act, motive and provocation, presence or absence of repeated
criminal acts on the part of the offender, instigation or acquiescence,
open and deliberate flouting of the law, and the possible effect of
the sentence on the offender."0
Oftentimes offenses are committed
under circumstances such that imposition of an extended prison term
is not warranted; still the infraction may be so serious that a judge
cannot with clear conscience suspend sentence completely. Further,
it is well recognized that prolonged association with hardened criminals may have a substantial contaminating effect ;31 the trial judge
28
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (1958).
For example, under a sentence like the one in the Lewis case, the
prisoner could be paroled after one year. A subsequent breach of the conditions of parole, however, would result in his return to prison to serve the
entire unexpired term, which would be three years. It is immaterial that
the time for which he was sentenced may have elapsed. State v. Yates, 183
N.C. 753, 111 S.E. 337 (1922).
" Coates, Punishment for Crime in North Carolina,17 N.C.L. REV. 205,
224 (1939).
8 BARNES & TEnma.s, op. cit. supra note 1, at 553. One solution to this
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might well feel that a particular defendant's potential for rehabilitation is good and that an extended prison term would be detrimental
to that promise. Under the rule of the Lewis case, however, the
trial judge is faced with a choice between black or white and has no
authority to consider the shades in between.
It is submitted that accordance of authority to trial judges to
utilize the split sentence would effectively fill the void between the
existing extremes of suspension in entirety or complete active imposition of the sentence. Presumably this could be legislatively accomplished by amending G.S. § 15-197 to provide express authorization for partial suspension."2 Such action would allow the judge
to treat the defendant more as an individual and to adapt the
sentence to the offender rather than to the offense. It would effect
recognition of "the differences in men which justify differences in
treatment and the differences in treatment which will achieve the
''83
ends at which we aim.

FRANK W.

BULLOCK, JR.

Domestic Relations-Abandonment-Divorce Granted to an
Abandoning Husband After the Wife's Action for Support

By statute in North Carolina,' a husband or wife, having lived
separate and apart from the other for two years, may obtain an
absolute divorce, provided the residence requirement is satisfied.
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that notwithstanding this statute if the husband has abandoned his wife, she
may set up the abandonment as a bar to his action for divorce.'
problem might be to provide for separation of defendants serving short split
sentences such as is now provided for youthful offenders. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-212 (Supp. 1959).
"2Should the North Carolina court adhere to the same reasoning as in the
Lewis case, however, they might regard this as an infringement on the
power of the parole board, and thus hold the provision of the statute to be
of no effect.

"' Coates, supra note 30, at 230.
'N.C. GENr. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).

'Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943). In this case the
court stated: "It is true, the statute under review provides that either party
may sue for a divorce or for a dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, 'if and
when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for two years'....
However, it is not to be supposed the General Assembly intended to authorize one spouse willfully or wrongfully to abandon the other for a period of
two years and then reward the faithless spouse a divorce for the wrong committed, in the face of a plea in bar based on such wrong." Id. at 90-91, 25
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A limitation on this interpretation first appeared in Lockhart vLockhart.3 There the court stated that the effect of a judgment
granting a divorce from bed and board was to legalize the separation
of the parties which theretofore had been an abandonment on the
part of the husband. The court then concluded that the separation
contemplated by the statute included a judicial separation as well as
one brought about by an act of the parties. Therefore, the husband
could obtain a divorce two years after such separation.
This limitation was again applied in the recent case of Sears v.
Sears.4 In this case the husband sought an absolute divorce on the
ground of two years separation. The wife, who had been awarded
a divorce from bed and board by a New York court, set up as a.
defense the fact that the husband had originally abandoned her. In
rejecting this defense and granting the divorce, the court stated that
the husband's abandonment did not preclude him from maintaining
the action since it was brought more than two years after the divorce
from bed and board.
These cases raise the following question: why should a husband.
who seeks a divorce on the ground of two years separation be denied.
such divorce because he has abandoned his wife, and yet be able to,
obtain a divorce two years subsequent to the wife's judgment for
alimony without divorce or divorce from bed and board?
The rationale of the court in refusing to grant the abandoninghusband a divorce before the wife has brought an action for support
is that the husband should not be permitted to profit from his own,
wrong.' But where the wife has obtained a support decree or a
S.E.2d at 470. Whether the abandonment must be criminal or civil in order
to be a good defense, the court in Byers indicated that abandonment without failure to support was not a good defense to an action for absolutedivorce based on two years separation. See also Hyder v. Hyder, 215 N.C.

239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939). But in Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d
296 (1957), the court indicated that abandonment was a bar to the husband's
action for divorce although the husband continued to support the wife. For

a discussion of this problem, see Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 495 (1958).
223 N.C. 559, 25 S.E.2d 902 (1941).
'253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960).
'Briggs v. Briggs, 215 N.C. 78, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939); Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 208 N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935). In the Sears case the court
referred to the wife's defense of abandonment as a plea of recrimination and
concluded that since the New York decree had legalized the separation of
the parties, she could not defend on the ground of recrimination. 253 N.C.
at 419, 117 S.E.2d at 10. But in Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d'
466 (1943), the court in holding that abandonment was a defense to an
action for divorce on the ground of two years separation, specifically statedthat this was not a matter of recrimination. The general rule is that the:

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

divorce for bed and board, the court, in granting the divorce, says
that the prior decree legalized the separation of the parties.'
It appears that the court is seeking to balance two conflicting
social policies: (1) where the parties cannot live together in
harmony, it is in the best interest of society and the parties themselves to grant a divorce irrespective of who was the original wrongdoer ;7 (2) the wife should not become dependent on society but
should be able to obtain alimony.
In North Carolina alimony cannot be awarded in an action
for absolute divorce.' Therefore, the wife will not be able to obtain
support unless she has obtained an alimony decree prior to an award
of absolute divorce to the husband. In order to protect the wife, the
court uses the "wrongdoer" theory to deny the husband a divorce
even though he has complied with the literal provisions of the
statute. However, if the husband is granted a divorce on the ground
of two years separation after the wife has obtained a support decree,
such decree will survive the divorce.' Since the wife is protected in
the latter instance, the court grants the divorce and justifies its
decision by using the "legalized separation" theory.
In the majority of states which have statutes similar to the
North Carolina statute,"0 a divorce may be granted to either party
recriminatory grounds must be of equal standing with the plaintiff's grounds
for divorce. Evans v. Evans, 219 Ark. 325, 241 S.W.2d 713 (1951); Pharr

v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943).

Since two years separation

is a ground for an absolute divorce and abandonment is a ground only for a
divorce from bed and board, the two are not of equal standing. Thus
abandonment is not a recriminatory defense to an action for divorce on the
ground of two years separation. The court seems to be confusing the
doctrine of recrimination with the rule that an abandoning party will not be
allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
'Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 25 S.E.2d 902 (1941).
Where the statute provides for an absolute divorce based on separation
for a specified period, the courts are inclined to grant a divorce to either
party in the best interest of society irrespective of fault. E.g., Parks v.
Parks, 116 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Bernard v. Jefferson, 191 La. 881,
186 So. 599 (1939); Lemp v. Lemp, 62 Nev. 91, 141 P.2d 212 (1943).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1959); Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 89

S.E.2d 867 (1955) ; Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946) ;

Duffy v. Duffy, 120 N.C. 346, 27 S.E. 28 (1897); accord, Commissioner v.
Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1959).
'0Eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have similar
statutes. They are listed in KE zER, MARRIAGE AND DivoRca § 455 (3d ed.
1946), as Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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notwithstanding his or her fault." Also, in the majority of states,
alimony may be awarded in an action for absolute divorce.'" Therefore, the husband may obtain a divorce even though the wife has not
previously obtained an alimony decree.'"
Although the North Carolina court may be achieving desirable
results under its present policies, it is not the function of the court
to determine what the social policy should be in an area in which
the legislature has already made such determination. Since the
legislature has provided in express terms that a divorce shall be
granted after two years separation, the court should not qualify
this in order to carry out another policy-that of protecting the
wife's right to support from her husband rather than from society.
It is submitted that the legislature should amend our statutes to
permit an award of alimony in an action for absolute divorce. This
will permit the court to carry out both social policies and at the
same time adhere to the express mandate of the two years separation
statute.
BORDEN

R.

HALLOWES

Domestic Relations-Divorce and Adoption-Residence Requirement
for Servicemen
Acquisition by service personnel of a domicile of choice has for
many years presented vexing quandaries both to lawyers and to
legislatures. For example, questions as to domicile may be of
critical importance in resolving problems encountered by servicemen
in such diverse areas as taxation,' establishment of voting rights in
11

".g.,
Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933); Sandlin
v. Sandlin, 289 Ky. 290, 158 S.W.2d 635 (1942) ; Best v. Best, 218 Ky. 648,
291 S.W. 1032 (1927) ; Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946) ;
Bernard v. Jefferson, 191 La. 881, 186 So. 599 (1939); Lemp v. Lemp, 62
Nev. 91, 141 P.2d 212 (1943).
" Northcutt v. Northcutt, 262 Ala. 98, 77 So. 2d 336 (1955) ; Schiebe v.
Schiebe, 57 Cal. App. 2d 336, 134 P.2d 835 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943) ; Weintraub
v. Weintraub, 302 N.Y. 104, 96 N.E.2d 724 (1951); Hyde v. McCoart, 82
R.I. 426, 110 A.2d 658 (1955).
"Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512 (1921) ; Rylands v.
Rylands, 65 Ariz. 97, 174 P.2d 741 (1946); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12,
41 P.2d 1059 (1935); Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519, 177 P.2d 200
(1947).
1 See Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
See
generally Baer, So Your Client Wants A Divorce, 24 N.C.L. Rrv. 1, 14
& n.55 (1945).
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a particular location,2 adoption3 or guardianship.4 Divorce cases,
however, constitute possibly the largest single source of litigation
involving determination of the place of domicile of military personnel.
The basic statutory provision in North Carolina respecting
jurisdictional prerequisites in divorce actions" requires that the
plaintiff allege that the complainant or defendant has been a resident
of this state for at least six months next preceding the filing of the
complaint. The North Carolina Supreme Court in construing this
statutory mandate has interpreted the word "resident" to mean
"domicile," thereby necessitating concomitance of residence and
animus manendi.'
In apparent recognition of the confusion engendered by application of this jurisdictional requirement in instances where one of the
parties to the action was in military service the General Assembly in
1959 enacted G.S. § 50-181 which provides,
In any action instituted and prosecuted under this chapter
[Divorce and Alimony], allegation and proof that the plaintiff
or the defendant has resided or been stationed at a United
States army, navy, marine corps, coast guard or air force
installation or reservation or any other location pursuant
to military duty within this State for a period of six months
next preceding the institution of the action shall constitute
compliance with the residence requirement set forth in this
chapter ....
It seems permissible to assume that the legislature was aware of
the interpretation that the North Carolina Supreme Court had
placed on the provisions of the existing jurisdictional statute.8 Thus,
enactment of G.S. § 50-18 seems clearly to evince legislative intent
to authorize the granting of a divorce to a serviceman upon a show2 See, e.g., Estopinal v. Michel, 121 La. 879, 46 So. 907 (1908); Dorsey
v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N.E. 303 (1898).
'See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, 94 Ind. App. 619, 180 N.E. 188 (1932);
Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 199 S.E. 677 (1938).
" See, e.g., McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945);
Beringer v. Beringer, 164 Misc. 413, 298 N.Y. Supp. 965 (Dom. Rel. Ct.

1937).

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (Supp. 1959).
SBryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-18 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (Supp. 1959).
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ing of something less than domicile as a basis for jurisdiction. 9
Perhaps the presence of a substantial number of military bases in
North Carolina, expectably resulting in a high percentage of divorce
actions involving servicemen, motivated this apparent attempt to
reduce the existing jurisdictional requirement. Other jurisdictions
have enacted similar statutes, 10 and still others have statutes which
employ language seemingly broad enough to authorize divorce jurisdiction, under certain circumstances, without a finding of domicile."
From the serviceman's point of view, the desirability of such statutory allowance is obvious; utilization of provisions of this nature
would circumvent the extreme inconvenience he would encounter if
forced to initiate an action in his "home" state.'2
Historically, divorce has been regarded as an action in rem, and
domicile has been considered the core of divorce jurisdiction."
Unfortunately, however, the United States Supreme Court never has
ruled on the precise question of whether some other relationship
between the state and litigants will provide an allowable foundation
for the judicial power to grant divorces. Judicial opinion has
divided sharply as to the effect of statutes purporting to authorize
divorce jurisdiction on a basis other than domicile: some courts
have regarded such legislative action valid to confer jurisdiction,' 4
while others have espoused the view that domicile is the only per' For a full exploration of the probable intent underlying enactment of this
statutory section, see Ligon, Is Domicile a JurisdictionalPrerequisite to a
Valid Divorce Decree?, 3 JAG J. 9 (1961).
"°GA. CODE ANN. § 30-107 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 601502 (1949); NED. REV. STAT. § 42-303 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4
(1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1272 (1961); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4631 (1960) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (1960).
"See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (Supp. 1961); CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46-1-3 (1954); ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 166-55 (Supp. 1959) ; N.Y.
CIVIL PRACTICE AcT § 1166.
" Aside from additional expense, probably the greatest obstacle in this
respect would be obtention of a furlough to coincide with the time of trial.
"3Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181
U.S. 175 (1901).
"'Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) ; Schaeffer v.
Schaeffer, 175 Kan. 629, 266 P.2d 282 (1954) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M.
414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807
(1959). Cf. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d
649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Many writers argue that the mandatory requirement of domicile is undesirable. See, e.g., COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 463 (1942); Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition
of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1951);
Lorzen, ExtraterritorialDivorce-Williams v. North Carolina II, 54 YALE

L.J. 799 (1945).
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missible jurisdictional predicate.' 5 Since
to support either view,"0 there could

ample legal authority exists
only be speculation as to the
position the North Carolina Supreme Court would adopt with reference to the provisions of G.S. § 50-18. The recent case of Martin
v. Martin17 provides the answer.
In Martin, the plaintiff-husband, a United States Army officer,
was assigned to Fort Bragg in July 1958, and served there con-

tinuously until August 1959. On July 6, 1959, he instituted an
action for absolute divorce on the ground of two years' separation,
and alleged that he had been a resident on the Fort Bragg Military
Reservation for more than six months next preceding the commencement of the action. The defendant-wife, who was present at the
trial, contended that the residence requirement set out in G.S.
§ 50-18 involved domicile and averred that the plaintiff did not
intend to make North Carolina his permanent home.
In evident reliance upon G.S. § 50-18, the trial judge instructed
the jury that if they found that the plaintiff had been stationed at
Fort Bragg pursuant to military duty for six months prior to the
bringing of the action, they should answer the issue of residence in
favor of the plaintiff. The defendant excepted to this charge. The
jury found for the plaintiff and judgment was entered in accordance
with the verdict.
On appeal this portion of the charge was held erroneous in that
it omitted the "requirement of intent to adopt North Carolina as legal
residence,""' and accordingly a new trial was awarded. Thus the
court imported to the specialized provisions of G.S. § 50-18 the exact
interpretation of residence requirement established under the basic
statute applicable to divorce jurisdiction. Several cases 9 from other
jurisdictions that had vigorously denied effect to similar statutes
which sought to establish jurisdictional bases for divorce on grounds
other than domicile were cited with approval in the opinion. Although decisions 0 that had held valid such statutory provisions were
"Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (dictum); Alton v.
Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953); Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36
So. 2d 236 (1948). See generally GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 396
(3d ed. 1949); RESTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 111 (1934).
"8For an excellent discussion that marshals the authorities supporting
each side of this controversy, see 38 N.C.L. REv. 154, 176-87 (1959).
17253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961).
81d.
i at 710, 118 S.E2d at 34.
' 9 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Jennings v. Jennings, 251
Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
"oCraig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936) ; Wallace v. Wallace,
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alluded to, the court expressly disapproved the conclusion reached by
these cases and stated, "We hold that-in order for the courts of this
State to exercise jurisdiction affecting, the rhatital status, at least
one of the parties to the action must be domiciled in the State. Mere
presence is insufficient."'" This broad language seems effectively
to sound the death knell for application of G.S. § 50-18 along the
lines of the presumptive legislative intent underlying its enactment,
i.e., relaxation of the stringent "domiciliary" residence requirement
in cases where a serviceman is a party to the divorce action.
In an effort to ascribe some effect to the statute involved the
court stated that it regarded G.S. § 50-18 as "an expression of policy
by the General Assembly that. a serviceman stationed on a military
reservation in the State is capable of establishing his domicile in
Upon examination of the language employed
North Carolina."2'
in the statute, however, .such a construction seems strained. , Certainly there is nothing in. the statute to imply that its application was
intended to be limited to servicemen actually living on a military
post who would thereby be under.United States jurisdiction rather
than that of the state. By express provision, the statute was designed
to extend to servicemen located anywhere ,in- North Carolina pursuant to military service. If the legislature had only intended that
the statute should -authorize the establishment of-domicile within the
state by armed forces personnel living on a military reservation, -nbodiment of, such language is unexplainable.
As has been pointed out, the holdirg in Martin aborted an
apparent attempt to confer divorce jurisdiction upon a basis other
than legally defined domicile. This pb.sitior ' may be justified in the
light of traditional views regarding divorce" (i) dissolution of a
marriage dhanr~ges the status of the parties and thus touches the
basic interests of society, and (2)_ domicile. alone provides an inter.63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (195$.. The:controlling, premise in these cases
was that since no definitive authority exists to establish domicile as the sole
permissible basis for divorce jurisdiction it -was withinrthe power of the
legislature to set other reasonable7 jurisdictional bases. ,,
21253 N.C. at 709, 118 S.E.2d at 31.
' 2 IbNd. Conversely, theNorth Carolina Supreme Court recently held that
a serviceman's domicile within the state is not lost merely because he leaves
pursuant to military service: Rather, his d6 micile remains'in the home state
unless he takes appropriate action to effect a change. Israel v. Israel,. 255
N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).
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connection between the state and the parties sufficient to authorize
control of such significant legal relations.2 3
The considerations discussed above would seem to be as
applicable to adoption as to divorce since an adoption also affects
status.24 This raises an interesting legal problem. In order to
adopt a child in North Carolina, it is required by statute that the
adopting parent be a resident of this state.25 If the legislature may
not base divorce jurisdiction on something less than domicile, does
it necessarily follow that the same would hold true in the case of
adoption? If so, is the validity of some of the adoptions by servicemen now in jeopardy?
Attacks upon adoption usually are made in one of two general
forms: motion to vacate the decree26 or habeas corpus proceeding
for custody of the child. 7 In either proceeding the decisive question
is whether the court which rendered the decree had jurisdiction.
Since adoption is not a common law action, the jurisdiction must
be accorded by statute. Widely differing views have been advanced
by courts as to the proper interpretation to be placed on the word
"resident" (or "resides") as it appears in various adoption statutes.
Although the better view would seem to be allowance of adoption on
the basis of residence in the ordinary sense,2" there is authority for
the proposition that residence as included within a particular adoption statute must be interpreted to mean domicile.3"
" See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
" There seems

to be a more or less inchoate notion that adoption operates

in rem or quasi in rem, though agreement as to the identity of the res and as
to its situs does not exist. For an exhaustive treatment of the cases in this
area and the underlying rationale of the decisions, see Taintor, Adoption in
the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. PirT. L. REv.222 (1953).

"N.C.

GEN. SAT.

§ 48-4 (1950).

" See, e.g., Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 393 (1942) ; Nealon
v. Farris, 131 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939); Strode v. Silverman,

209 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
"See, e.g., Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943); Watt v.
Dunn, 236 Iowa 67, 17 N.W.2d 811 (1945); Brooks v. De Witt, 178 S.W.2d
718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
"" Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal. App. 137, 256 Pac. 484 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
See generally PEcK, Tr. LAW OF PERSoNS AND DOMEsTic RELATioNS 352
(3d ed. 1930).
" Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921); Van Matre v.
Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N.E. 628 (1893); Succession of Caldwell, 114 La.
195, 38 So. 140 (1905); Waller v. Ellis, 169 Md. 15, 179 Atl. 289 (1935);
In re Adoption of Russell, 170 Pa. Super. 358, 85 A.2d 878 (1952).
"In re Webb's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176, 177 P.2d 222 (1947); In re
Goodman, 49 Del. 550, 121 A.2d 676 (Orphans' Ct. 1952); Johnson v.
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Although the United States Supreme Court has not expressly
ruled on the question, it appears that a decree of adoption, rendered
with proper jurisdiction and without fraud on the court, is entitled
to normal full faith and credit protection for all purposes. 3' But
such a judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive
or final effect in a sister state than in the rendering state.3 2 Before
grantifig full faith and credit to the decree, a sister state may demand
proof that the adoptions were valid under the law-of the state granting the adoption.3 3
Since the North Carolina court has never had occasion to interpret the word "residence" in our adoption statute, it would be
unfortunate if a sister state should seize upon the decision in Martin
as a basis for refusing to give full faith and credit to a child adopted
by a serviceman in North Carolina. Until either the United States
Supreme Court or the North Carolina Supreme Court interprets
residence in regard to adoption, an attorney would be well advised
to get into the record evidence sufficient to support a finding of bona
fide domicile of the adopting parent. And in cases where it is clear
that the adopting parents are not domiciled in North Carolina, it
would seem advisable for the attorney to inform them of the possible
"pitfalls" that they might face later.
C. EDWIN ALLMAN, JR.

Federal Income Taxation-Deductibility of Meal and Lodging
Expenses as Medical Care
It is probable that during any given year a large number of
people in the United States will encounter sickness or injury and
will be advised by their physician to take a trip entiriely for medical
treatment. Since certain medical expenses are deductible for income
tax purposes,' there arises a question as to what trip expenses may
be properly classified as a medical care deduction. This is especially
true when the taxpayer is not confined to a hospital or other institution and is accompanied on the trip by his wife and, possibly,
Smith, 94 Ind. App. 619, 180 N.E. 188 (1932); Heirich v. Howe, 50 N.M.
90, 171 P.2d 312 (1946) ; Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 199 S.E. 677 (1938).
" 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICr OF LAWS: A ComPAPATivw STUDY 645 (1945);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS § 143 (1934).

New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614 . (1947).
Welkh v. Jacobsmeyer, 216 La. 334, 43 So. 2d 678 (1949).
INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §213(a).

'*
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his dependents.2 Recently two taxpayers brought this precise'.question to the courts for clarification and received conflicting results.
In Commissioner v. Bilder3 the petitioner, who lived, in New
Jersey, suffered from a long history of heart trouble and was advised
by his physician to spend the winter months in a warm climate.
Following this advice, the petitioner, his wife and his three-year-old
daughter rented an apartment and spent the winter months of. 1954
and 1955 in Florida. On his tax returns for these years be took as
a medical care deduction -the full amount of the apartment rental
and his transportation costs. He did not include any deduction for
meals. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency for the stated deductions, and the Tax Court reversed. The Tax Court allowed his
. transportation costs in full but only one-third of the total apartment
rentals since it was not shown that the taxpayer needed his family
*on the trip as a part of the medical treatment. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit vacated the judgment of the Tax Court and
remanded. The court of appeals' approved not only his transportation deduction.but all of the deduction for apartment rentals, finding
that it was necessary for the petitioner's family to accompany him
on the trip for proper treatment of the disease.
Carasso v. Commissioner involved a taxpayer who had been
stricken by a serious illness that resulted in the removal of a major
part of his stomach. On his doctor's recommendation the taxpayer
and, his ,wife, in 1956, flew from their home in New York, to
Bermuda'for convalescence. On his tax return for 195.6, the taxpayer took a medical care deduction for hotel, meals, transportation
'and exit -tax.7expen~es which he and his wife incurred on the trip.
The Tax Court' found that his wife's presence was essential and
allowedtie total deduction claimed with the exception of the expenses
for the'hotel rental and meals. On appeal by the taxpayer, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
The real conflict arising from these cases evolves around the
definition of 'medical care." The medical care deduction was first
introduced in 1942 as section 23(x) of the Code of 1939, and at
2 If the taxpayer is an in-patient at a hospital or other qualified institution
(as determined by the treasury regulation's), it is quite clear that he will be
allowed a deduction for the costs of his meals and lodging furnished therein.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(v) (1957). "
'289 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961), cert.' granted, 30 U.S.L. WzE i 3154
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1961) (No. 384).
'292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961).
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that time the term was broadly defined. 5 Taken in conjunction with
section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code,' it was possible to include as
extraordinary medical expenses certain expenditures which would
normally fall into the category of personal, living, or family expenses. These two sections were interpreted to permit deductions
in proper situations for meals and lodging while on a trip for
medical reasons. 7 The Commissioner had acquiesced in this interpretation.8
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 replaced section 23(x) of
the 1939 Code with section 213. It provides an identical definition
for medical care except for the specific addition of transportation
expenses incurred in connection with medical care. In addition the
1954 Code replaced section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code with section
262,"0 which provides in effect that no deduction can be taken for
personal, living, or family expenses unless expressly provided by the
Code. Unlike its predecessor, section 262 makes no mention of
extraordinary medical expenses being an exception to this rule.
5
INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 23(x) (2), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 825
(1942), provided: "The term 'medical care,' as used in this subsection, shall
include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-

vention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function
of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance)."
"The term 'medical care' is broadly defined to include amounts paid for

the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body. It is not intended, however, that a deduction should be allowed for any. expense that is
not incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or
mental defect or illness." S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96

(1942).

'INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §24(a) (1), as amended, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 826
(1942): "In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed

in respect of-(1) Personal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary
medical expenses deductible under section 23(x) ..."

Embry's Estate v. Gray, 143 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1956), appeal
dismissed on motionr of appellant-DistrictDirectorof Internal Revenue, 244
F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1957); Stanley D. Winderman, 32 T.C. 1197 (1959);
Bertha M. Rodgers, 25 T.C. 254 (1955); L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C.
580 (1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950); Edward A. Havey, 12
T.C. 409 (1949).
'Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(x)-i (1943); Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 Cum.
BULL. 307.
"INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 213(e): "Definitions-for purposes of this

section-(1) The term 'medical care' means amounts paid-(A) for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including amounts
paid for accident or health insurance), or (B) for transportation primarily
for and essential to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A)."
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262.
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The Senate and House Committee Reports on section 262 indicate that no substantive change in section 24(a) (1) was intended
to be made." In connection with section 213(e), which includes
the definition for medical care, the House and Senate Committee
Reports indicate that a new definition of medical care was intended,
and that this new definition should include regulations already in
effect plus a deduction for transportation costs incurred on a trip
prescribed for health, but "not the ordinary living expenses incurred
during such a trip."'" They specifically pointed out that no deduction was to be allowed for meals and lodging while on a trip for
medical purposes. An example was given which contemplated a fact
situation similar to that found in the two principal cases. 8
The Treasury Regulations which correspond to the aforementioned two sections of the Code merely affirm the intent shown in the
committee reports. The regulations pertaining to section 262 point
out that certain items of a personal, living, or family nature are
deductible under some sections of the Code (section 213 is one of
those listed) but only to the extent expressly provided under the
particular section and the regulations to that section. 4 The regulations under section 213 (e) of the Code provide that the cost of any
meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical treatment, except in an institution, shall not be a deductible expense.
However, the cost of transportation for such a trip essential to the
rendition of medical care is considered an expense paid for medical
care.

15

Generally, when the courts are called upon to interpret statutes,
the language of the statutes is construed "so as to give effect to the
" S. Rr. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1954); H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A65 (1954).
2
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954).
"8"The deduction permitted for 'transportation primarily for and essential
to medical care' clarifies existing law in that it specifically excludes deduction of any meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical
treatment. For example, if a doctor prescribes that a patient must go to
Florida in order to alleviate specific chronic ailments and to escape unfavorable climatic conditions which have proven injurious to the health of
the taxpayer, and the travel is prescribed for reasons other than the general
improvement of a patient's health, the cost of the patient's transportation to
Florida would be deductible but not his living expenses while there." S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A60 (1954).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(c) (1958).
"6Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (iv) (1957).
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intent of Congress."'
It is presently the thought that the proper
meaning "can only be derived from a considered weighing of every
relevant aid to construction."' 17 The Supreme Court has further
said that "words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason
there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on superficial examination.' ,
This trend of thought has been extended
to tax cases, and it is no longer the rule that all doubts are to be
construed in favor of the taxpayer. 9
In the Bilder case the Tax Court refused to consider the congressional intent of section 213 because it felt that the section was
virtually the same as section 23(x), except for the reference to
transportation expenses."
In its opinion the Tax Court cited
previous cases 2- decided by it on this question under section 23 (x)
of the 1939 Code and held that these prior decisions governed the
instant case. However, the court failed to recognize that in each
case cited as being pertinent, section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code
was discussed as being necessarily read in conjunction with section
23 (x) in order to provide deductions for meal and lodging expenses
in proper cases. 22 Thus it seems that the Tax Court made two
basic errors: (1) it failed to look to the legislative history of section
213; and (2) it failed to take into consideration the fact that section
262 must be read together with section 213 in order to properly
consider the question presented in the principal case.
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1939).
'United States v. Dickerson,
310 U.S. 554, .562 (1939). See also
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955). Earlier decisions invoked the "plain meaning rule" and would not look to legislative history where the terms of the

statute were clear. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
385, 396 (1868).
" Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1942).
11White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
"Robert M. Bilder, 33 T.C. 155, 158 (1959). In a previous case the
court did consider the congressional committee reports and stated: "[T]he
committee reports . . . clearly show a congressional intent to codify the

preexisting [sic] concepts of medical care." Frank S. Delp, 30 T.C. 1230,
1235 (1958). This was done in spite of the fact that the reports said a new
definition for "medical expenses" was intended.

The new definition would

not have affected that particular case, but it would play an important role
in the case now under consideration.
" L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580 (1949); Edward A. Havey, 12
T.C. 409 (1949).
" L. Keever Stringham, supra note 21, at 583-84; Edward A. Havey,
supra note 21, at 411-12. See also Bertha M. Rodgers, 25 T.C. 254, 259

(1955).
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When the Bilder case reached the court of appeals, the majority,
like the Tax Court, did not discuss section 262. In the opinion
of the dissenting judge this was pointed out as being their "fundamental mistake."2 The majority, however, did consider the committee reports accompanying section 213, but they drew the conclusion that the reports were ambiguous and made for confusion, not
clarification. The, majority felt that if Congress had wanted to
limit the deduction as the Commissioner contended, they should have
done so in clear and express terms. In the absence of this unequivocal language in the statute itself, the court said:
[S]ince Section 213(a), (e)(1)(A) of the 1954 Code is a
re-enactment of Section 23(x) of the 1939 Code, and the
courts (and the Commissioner) over a twelve year period
had construed Section 23 (x) to permit allowance of lodging
and meals as "medical expenses" where they were incurred as
"medical care," "the long and well-settled construction" of
Section 23 (x), plus its re-enactment without change of "the
established interpretation" provide "most persuasive indications" that the judicial construction "has become part of the
warp and woof" of Section 213.24
In the Carasso case the Tax Court modified the position it took
in the Bilder case to the extent that it disapproved its own failure
to examine the legislative history of section Z13.2" However, the
Tax Court still failed to mention section 262, and it refused to
express an opinion whether or not meals and lodging would be
deductible if the circumstances were different.2" The court of appeals
noted the change in section 262 from that of 24(a) (1), and tie
similarity between section 213 and 23(x). The court then questioned whether these changes indicated an intent on the part of
Congress to change the interpretation applied under the 1939 Code.
the court stated that the language of 'these sections really did not
conclusively answer this question and that a resort to the committee reports was necessary. By an examination of these reports the
court found language which clearly indicated that the intent of
"' Commissioner v. Bilder, 289 F.2d 291, 307 (3d Cir. 1961).
"I Id. at 303.
"5Max Carasso, 34 T.C. 1139 (1960).
"This decision was handed down before the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals handed down its opinion in the Bilder case, and two judges dissented.

1962]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Congress was to prohibit a deduction for meals and lodging in
situations like the one in question.
It is submitted that the preferable construction is that followed by
the court in Carasso and suggested by the dissenting judge in Bilder.
Using this rule under the new sections, only transportation costs
are deductible while meals and lodging are not. The probable
reason for the legislative limitation on the meal and lodging deduction was the abuse of it by taxpayers who were using the provision
as a means of obtaining "tax deductible vacations." But it certainly seems that the trips taken by the taxpayers in the two principal cases would fall into a "necessity" category, and that the costs
incurred, while of a personal living expense nature, were "extraordinary" medical expenses. Perhaps Congress did, as the majority
suggested in the Bilder case, become entangled in sweeping terms
which prohibited a deduction in cases where the trip was essential
to the health of the taxpayer. However, the language of the statutes
and of the committee reports is too strong to be subject to judicial
construction in favor of the taxpayer, and only Congress by new
legislation can correct the non-allowance of this justifiable deduction.
H.

ARTHUR SANDMAN

Partnerships-Profit Sharing by Lender
Should a corporation which lends money to another corporation
be held a partner of the latter where the loan is secured, the lender
is to be repaid the principal and interest and is to share in the
borrower's profits? The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with this question in Minute Maid Corp. v. United Foods, Inc.'
United Foods, a broker of frozen foods, was an authorized
direct buyer of products packaged by Minute Maid Corporation.
By receiving notice of price increases a considerable time in advance,
United Foods could realize a speculative profit on inventories in addition to substantial volume discounts and allowances if it had sufficient
financial resources to buy large quantities. United Foods, not having
sufficient funds nor normal credit sources to make such purchases,
entered into a written agreement with United States Cold Storage
Corporation. The agreement provided: (1) Cold Storage would
lend money to United Foods to purchase foods; (2) the purchased
'291 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1961).
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goods and accounts receivable from sales of these goods would be
collateral for the loans; (3) notes for the loans would be given; and
(4) a "Special Account" would be set up on the books of Cold
Storage and managed by it. The "Special Account" would be
debited for all the warehouse charges and credited with all discounts
and allowances made by Minute Maid and any profits realized by
United Foods on the sale of goods bought with the borrowed money.
At the end of the year the "Special Account" would be closed, and
any profits or losses would be divided.'
During the life of this agreement United Foods became heavily
indebted to Minute Maid for food purchases. Minute Maid sought
to recover from Cold Storage on the ground that the contract constituted a partnership under the law of Texas, but the district court
held that no partnership existed. On appeal the court of appeals
reversed.
The court considered two major points in concluding that a
partnership existed by virtue of the written agreement. First, the
court found that under the Texas definition of a partnership' a common business existed by virtue of the arrangement whereby Cold
Storage was to furnish the financing and warehouse facilities and
United Foods was to make use of its position as a direct buyer of
Minute Maid products. Cold Storage contended that the agreement
created only a debtor-creditor relationship. The court readily admitted that such a relationship existed between the two corporations,
but termed this "indecisive." 4
It is undoubtedly true that one may be both a lender and a partAt-the end of seven months the contract was terminated, the "Special
Account" dosed, and a profit of twenty-two thousand dollars was divided

between the parties.
' "We take it, therefore, to be the law of Texas that if the parties entered
into a contract from which it is clear that the parties contemplated joining
in a common business for their common benefit to be operated for their joint

account and in which they as owners each of an interest would be entitled

to share as principals in the profits as such, they would be partners." 291
F.2d at 583.
- Although Texas had adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, it did not
become effective until after this case. However, the same problem which
'faced the court could also arise under the act since its definition of a partnership is essentially the same as that given by the court. For a discussion
.of the act, see Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617
(1915); Sher & Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 20th Century3;hy Texas ShQuld Adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 263
(1958).
'291 F.2d at 583.
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ner at the same time.' The court therefore was correct in holding
that the debtor-creditor relationship was not the sole factor to be
considered. However, according to past Texas cases, the existence
of a debtor and creditor relationship is a very important factor in
finding that no partnership exists.'
Secondly, from the fact that Cold Storage had the right to accept
or reject proposed collateral for loans and the fact that the parties
might agree on the volume of goods to be purchased on notice of any
price increases, the court found that joint control existed. The court
supported its conclusion by referring to the testimony of an officer of
United Foods that Cold Storage could have stepped in and "written
United off." However, rather than showing the existence of joint
control, this statement would seem to indicate that Cold Storage had
a form of veto power. It has been held that possession of a veto
power by the lender is not sufficient alone to constitute the lender a
partner with his borrower.7
No definite rule can be drawn from the cases as to how much
control must be possessed by a lender before he will be held a partner
since this is a matter of degree, but the cases do provide a basis for
examples and for some generalization. A partnership was found
not to exist where the lender received a share of the profits and (1)
had his agent in control of the books and management of the business, received a mortgage on all the financed goods and received all
the proceeds from sales;' (2) held -the right to veto speculative
ventures of the borrower;9 (3) required that all the borrower's
property be placed in trust for him until the loan was repaid ;1o (4)
received liens on the borrowers' crops and tools and could prohibit
'See, e.g., Nye v. United States, 84 F.2d 457 (1st Cir. 1936); De
Martini v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 90 Cal. App. 2d 139, 202 P.2d 828
(Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
'Davis v. Gilmore, 244 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Dunn v.
Hankins, 127 S.W.2d 983 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Cosner v. Weller, 109
S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Eddingston v. Acorn, 259 S.W. 948
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
"Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927).
8 Dubos v. Jones, 34
Fla. 539, 16 So. 392 (1894). The court termed
the controls security measures which did not alter the relationship of debtor
and creditor. However, it should be noted that this case appears to be
inconsistent with the weight of authority.
"Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927). The court referred to this power as a measure of ordinary caution.
"lIt re Mission Farms Dairy, 56 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1932).
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the borrowers from pooling their resources;"

(5)
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could cause

liquidation of the borrower's business. 2
A partnership was held to exist where the lender shared in the
profits and (1) made no provision in the agreement for repayment
of the advances, but provided for the lender's agent to manage the
borrower's business and to receive and sell all the manufactured
products ;3 (2) the lender had complete authority to dispose of the
business output, and the products bore the lender's label;14 (3) the
lender kept the books and signed the checks;" (4) the lender
assumed complete control of the business ;1 (5) the lender paid the
borrower's bills.'
In these cases it was felt that the control went
beyond ordinary security measures and entered into the realm of
complete takeover or management of the business, either with the
borrower or to the latter's exclusion.
It would seem that the controls in the principal case amounted to
nothing more than security measures. When compared with the
above cases which found that a partnership existed, the controls in
the principal case are not nearly as extensive. It is submitted that
the decision of the principal case is against the weight of authority.
Where a creditor exercises controls which in form and substance are
nothing more than protective measures for his loan, no partnership
should be held to exist in the absence of estoppel or a clear intent
to become partners.'8
T.
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"Eddingston v. Acorn, 259 S.W. 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
'McGurk v. Moore, 234 N.C. 248, 67 S.E.2d 53 (1951).
San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. v. Costaloupes, 96 Cal. App. 322, 274
Pac. 84 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
"Southern Can Co. v. Hartlove, 152 Md. 303, 136 At. 624 (1927).
15 Collyer v. Egbert, 200 Wash. 342, 93 P.2d 399 (1939).
' Hudson Letter Co. v. Racette, 244 Mich. 144, 221 N.W. 151 (1928).
Causey v. Cottman Co., 12 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1926).
's One of the reasons suggested by the dissenting judge for not finding a
partnership was that intent to create a partnership is an essential element
of partnership. However, he stated that it is the manifested intent and not
the secret subjective intent which is controlling. He found no evidence of
an intent to create a partnership here. 291 F.2d at 585.

